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Three cases pending before the Supreme Court present a unique
opportunity to clarify the respective roles of the military and the
judiciary in time of crisis.' All three cases involve military detentions
and the administration's claim of unreviewable discretion to imprison
persons accused either of taking up arms against the United States or of
plotting terrorist actions. The Bush administration's challenge to judicial
review lies at the heart of its so-called "war" on terrorism because it
reflects the idea that civilian courts cannot second-guess the decisions of
military commanders. It is important to the rule of law that courts not
cede unreviewable authority to the military on our own soil.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Military detention of civilians on domestic soil is far from a new idea
in the United States. The War of 1812 produced a few examples,3 the Civil
War saw Lincoln's use of military tribunals for Southern sympathizers,4 and
World War II produced Japanese internment . For the most part, these
experiences have produced a pattern of judicial tolerance and deference
to the Executive during the initial stages of emergency followed by a
sober rethinking of power when passions have cooled and fear has
receded.6
Early reaction to the Bush administration's claims of executive power
focused on the plan for use of military commissions to try accused
1. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 25616 (2d Cir., Dec.
18, 2003), cert. granted 2004 U.S. Lexis 1011 (Feb. 20, 2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316
F. 3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 157 L.Ed. 2d 812, 124 S. Ct. 981 (Jan 9, 2004);
Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 157 L. Ed. 2d
407, 2003 WL 22070725 (Nov. 10, 2003). See also Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th
Cir., Dec. 18, 2003).
2. Much of the same ground has been covered by others with different emphases.
Carl Tobias, Detentions, Military Commissions, and Domestic Case Precedent, 76 So.
CAL. L. REV. 1371 (2003); Laura Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism:
Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 So.
CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002).
3. Apparently, President Madison acquiesced in holdings of state and lower
federal courts to the effect that neither military commanders nor courts-martial had
power to detain or prosecute civilian citizens for spying or treason. Ingrid Brunk Wuerth,
The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants:" Modem Lessons from Mr.
Madison's Forgotten War, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004); In re Stacy, 10 JOHNS.
328, 333 (N.Y. 1813) (granting habeas corpus for citizen held "without any color of
authority in any military tribunal to try a citizen for" treason).
4. Exparte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866); see generally WILLIAM H REHNQUIST, ALL
THE LAWS BUT ONE (1998).
5. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see generally Personal
Justice Denied, Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians (Univ. Washington Press 1997).
6. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1019-20 (2003).
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terrorists. 7 Professor Paust, a former faculty member of the Army JAG
School, takes the position that the President's power to establish military
commissions, whether derived from constitutional or statutory sources,
8
applies only within a combat zone or war-related occupied territory and
that the authority ends when peace is finalized. 9 Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, however, argue that President Bush had statutory authority to
issue the Order, and probably also had independent constitutional authority
to do so as Commander in Chief.10
As events have unfolded, the proposed military commissions are only
a small part of the story. First, the administration decided that hundreds
of persons of diverse nationalities captured in armed conflict with
another nation could be transported to an island military base not on
national soil and held as combatants of the capturing nation but not as
prisoners of war.1 International human rights organizations castigate
the United States for holding prisoners in violation of international
conventions. 12 In the first of the Supreme Court cases to be accepted for
7. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
8. The power as Commander-in-Chief under Art. II arguably could be
implemented without statutory authority, but Congress has power to "make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the [armed] forces." The authority for military commissions
found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice is now codified at 10 U.S.C. § 821.
9. Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23
MICH. J. INT L LAW 1, 5, 9 (2001). Professor Paust argues that even Guantanamo Bay is
not a "war-related occupied territory." Id. at 25 n.70. The word finalized is an important
qualifier on the statement because the power can extend throughout occupation of
conquered territory or even beyond occupation with the consent of a new government.
See also Neal Kaytal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002.
10. Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of
Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 249 (2002). "Although the Order was not
preceded by a congressional declaration of war, such a declaration is not constitutionally
required in order for the President to exercise his constitutional or statutory war powers,
including his power to establish military commissions. We also argue that the
September 11 terrorist attacks, to which the Order was a response, violate the laws of
war and therefore fall within the jurisdiction of military commissions."
11. U.S. White House, "Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo," (Feb. 7,
2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2004).
12. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights resigned "under
fire" for criticism of major nations' records, including statements regarding the U.S.
detentions at Guantanamo. Associated Press, U.N. Human Rights Leader Exits After
Criticizing U.S., Others (Sept. 8, 2002).
The International Committee of the Red Cross has been critical of the U.S. policy
position, but has accomplished its principal objectives of being allowed to visit detainees
certiorari, representatives of these detainees assert that treaty obligations
should be enforced by the U.S. courts, primarily the rights of these
persons to a determination of their status by a "competent tribunal."' 3 For
this purpose, military commissions would be an appropriate competent
tribunal, but it is up to the civilian courts to determine whether treaty law
creates individually enforceable rights.
Second, the administration decided that a U.S. citizen captured overseas
in the same operation's zone of "armed conflict" could be declared an
"enemy combatant" and held in custody with no contact with the outside
world and no prospects of judicial proceedings.' 4 Although this detainee,
Yaser Hamdi, might have been held in military detention in the zone of
combat or theater of operations, as soon as he was transferred to U.S.
soil he reacquired rights embodied in basic concepts of due process such
as the right to a fair hearing on his alleged wrongdoing.
Third, the administration then decided that even a U.S. citizen arrested
on domestic soil for an inchoate crime could similarly be declared an
"enemy combatant" and held in military detention without access to
counsel or a hearing on his alleged wrongdoing. The Second Circuit has
held that the President has no such authority to hold Jose Padilla.
5
Rounding out the picture, in a fourth case, the administration decided
that a foreign national arrested on domestic soil for an inchoate crime
could similarly be declared an "enemy combatant" and held in military
detention without access to counsel or a hearing on his alleged
wrongdoing. A petition for habeas corpus on his behalf is pending in
and carry messages from them to relatives. "There has been much public debate about
whether the internees in Guantanamo Bay are prisoners of war or not. The ICRC thinks
that the legal status of each internee needs to be clarified on an individual basis and has
repeatedly urged the United States to do this. In any case, the United States has the right
to legally prosecute any internee at Guantanamo Bay suspected of having committed war
crimes or any other criminal offence punishable under U.S. law prior to or during the
hostilities." Guantanamo Bay: Overview of the ICRC's Work for Internees, at http://www.
icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/5QRC5V (last modified Aug. 25, 2003).
Amnesty International has openly complained that the United States is violating
international law in its detention and treatment of detainees at Guantanamo. See USA:
Treatment of Prisoners in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay Undermines Human Rights,
At index AMR 51/054/2002 (Apr. 15, 2002), at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/
AMR510542002 (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
Human Rights Watch describes the Guantanamo detentions as a "legal black hole."
United States: Guantanamo Two Years On, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/O1/09/
usdom6917.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2004).
13. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 157
L. Ed. 2d 407, 2003 WL 22070725 (Nov. 10, 2003).
14. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 1, at 466 (judicial review limited to
determining on the basis of custodian's affidavit that "enemy combatant" was armed and
in the company of enemy troops), cert. granted, *** (Jan. 9, 2004).
15. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, supra note 1.
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the Central District of Illinois. 16
In assessing the validity of these detentions, the proposed military
commissions are relevant for two reasons. First, they could be the
mechanism by which the United States satisfies its treaty obligations to
make a determination of the status of detainees captured in a zone of
armed conflict. Second, the background of military commissions and
their application of the "law of war" explicate some of the law that can
be applied to persons who threaten the peace and security of the state.
U.S. military commissions are available only when authorized by statute
or the "law of war,' 17 so it becomes important to distinguish those
violations from the actions of ordinary criminals. This is important to
American law, not to denigrate military tribunals but to validate the
basic assumptions of American civil justice and to lend coherence to an
otherwise incoherent set of choices. The military-civilian interaction
around the offenses of espionage, treason, and civilian violence will also
be instructive in dealing with the handling of alleged terrorists. And
even the experience of the United States in bringing federal ("supra-
state") power to bear on the Ku Klux Klan after the Civil War bears
some corollaries to the need for international law to operate on the
international terrorist.
What these cases allow, then, is a wide-ranging exploration of the
relationships among military action, law enforcement, and judicial review.
From the focus of military detentions, this article will deal with significant
parts of military-judicial interaction and will assert these conclusions:
1. In all instances, the judiciary has the obligation to exercise
judicial review of the bases for an executive detention.
2. With respect to a U.S. national arrested on domestic soil,
there is no basis for military detention so long as the civilian
courts are open and operating and no allegation that the
accused was acting on behalf of an enemy nation.
16. Al-Marri v. Bush, Petition for Habeas Corpus, available at http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/almarri/almarribush707O3pet.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2004). The
Government's Motion to Dismiss is available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
almarri/almarribush7l603gmot.pdf ("The petition in this case seeks to interject this
Court into the President'sconduct of ongoing hostilities in the war on terrorism.").
17. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994) ("The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction
upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals.").
3. With respect to a U.S. national captured in a combat zone,
there is basis for initial detention to make that person hors
de combat, but transfer out of the theater of operations
brings that person within the domain of the civilian courts.
4. With respect to foreign nationals detained on territory under
the exclusive control of the United States, both customary
international law and treaty obligations apply, and the
question for the U.S. courts is the extent to which they will
enforce those obligations as individual rights.
5. With respect to a foreign national arrested on U.S. soil, there
is precedent for applying military justice if that person were
acting as an agent of a foreign belligerent nation in violation
of the "law of war" but there is no basis for executive
detention without any form of hearing.
In some degree, this article touches on the choice of whether to use the
language and tools of war or the language and tools of law enforcement
in responding to terrorism.' 8 The principal focus, however, is on the
limited issue of judicial review and military detentions. That is enough
for the moment.
II. MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF
"ENEMY COMBATANT"
The U.S. administration argues that military commissions can be
convened pursuant to the President's C-in-C powers as augmented by
statutory authorization for the use of military commissions when
warranted by the law of war.' 9 The argument is that members of a well-
organized international terrorist group engaged in violent attack on the
United States qualify as enemy combatants under international law. The
counter-argument is that the customs and usages of international law
permit military commissions to operate only in the actual "theater of
operations" of the military or in occupied territory. We will get to the
details of these arguments after developing much of the background and
implications of using military commissions.
With regard to those who carry out illegal activities within this country on
behalf of a foreign state, the Supreme Court was willing to allow the
18. Professor Feldman asserts that the choice between these two paradigms is
subject to ascertainable criteria. Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 457 (2002). Professor Paust decries the use of war models in
the absence of a recognizable belligerent. Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After
9/11: Attacks on the Law of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325 (2003). See also Kenneth
Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2 (Jan./Feb. 2004).
19. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994).
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military to deal with them outside the setting of the normal criminal
processes during World War Rl.20 That incident, however, is "bookended"
by Civil War cases insisting that military courts cannot operate in areas
where the civilian courts are open and operating 21 and by the invalidity
of using military tribunals in Hawaii during World War 11.22
A great deal of speculation has been devoted to the issue of whether
military commissions can be assembled for al Qaeda members.
Interestingly, however, not a single commission has yet been empaneled
for prosecution of a terrorist offense. I am choosing to add to the
speculation here because the subject casts considerable light on the
remainder of our issues.
A. The Civil War and World War II Precedents
The leading case is Ex parte Quirin,23 in which eight persons were
arrested early in World War II by the FBI and handed over to military
authorities to be tried for war crimes on the basis of their conducting
military operations out of uniform.2 4 They had landed in two groups of
four by German submarine, one group on Long Island with targets in
New York City and the other group near Jacksonville, Florida with a
variety of targets. Each had undergone training in Germany, was paid
by German officials, was issued a German military uniform to wear until
ashore in the United States, was arrested in civilian clothing, and had
brought a quantity of explosives ashore. With a bit of procedural
maneuvering regarding whether captured spies could even have recourse
to the civilian courts for a writ of habeas corpus, which the Supreme
Court did not hesitate to answer affirmatively, the Court held that they
were not entitled to the processes of civil courts but could be dealt with
under military law for violations of the "law of war."
The Constitution has three statements regarding the place and type of
trial for offenses against the United States, with one key exception for
cases "arising in the land and naval forces, or in the Militia, in actual
20. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1942).
21. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266,
293 (1878); see Paust, supra note 9, at 5, 9.
22. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (decided on statutory grounds
but with constitutional overtones).
23. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 2-3.
24. As spies or saboteurs, they could have been tried in civilian courts because
espionage is not a war crime. As members of a military force engaged in combat out of
uniform, they were committing war crimes.
service in time of War or public danger., 25 For substantive rules of criminal
behavior, Article I, § 8 grants Congress the power, in addition to the
familiar power to make rules and regulations for governance of the
military, "To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations."
Taking all these provisions together, it is easy to construct the
argument that it is up to Congress to define and criminalize offenses
such as sabotage and war crimes, that the place of trial shall be where
the offense was committed or such other place as directed by law, that
the accused is entitled to trial by jury and the other rights of the sixth
amendment, and that none of this contemplates anything other than the
normal processes of the civilian courts except in cases "arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger.' ,26 The exception is so clearly targeted to offenses
committed by U.S. personnel that it is difficult to imagine its application
to foreign nationals one way or the other.
These provisions are all so consistent with each other and with the
argument for civilian courts that it is difficult to construct the counter
argument. The Supreme Court in Quirin relied upon a minimal amount
of textual analysis to point out that the Article III and Fifth Amendment
provisions must be read in light of their historical understanding, which
was that not all offenses give rise to a right of trial by jury. The two
examples used for this purpose-petty offenses and criminal contempt
charges-did not give rise to a jury trial but did remain in the civilian
27court systems. The Quirin opinion also relied on a structural anomaly;
25. The trial of all Crimes except in cases of Impeachment shall be by Jury
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and notice of charges, confrontation or witnesses,
subpoena power, and right to counsel.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26. See Paust, supra note 9, at 5.
27. After Quirin, there have been further restrictions placed on both these
exceptions to jury trial, defining petty offenses as those punishable by no more than six
months incarceration in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), and requiring a
separate trial for contempt that does not threaten the continuation of the proceedings in
Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969). See also Harris v. United States, 382 U.S.
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if our own troops are subject to military tribunals, why should the alleged
bad guys get better treatment by being sent to the civilian system?
Most of the opinion was historical, citing examples from the Revolutionary
War and Civil War of alleged spies who were subjected to the death
penalty either by commanding officer fiat or after the current version of
a military proceeding. Of interest to the current situation, the Court stated
in no uncertain terms that the offenders were outside the constitutional
guaranty of trial by jury, not because they were aliens 28 but because they
had violated the law of war by committing offenses traditionally triable
by military tribunal.29
This approach makes the jurisdiction of military tribunals depend on
the nature of the charged offense or violation of the law of war. In the
case of members of terrorist groups, what law of war has been violated?
Quirin was decided in the unquestioned context of war, a more or less
easily understood term referring to conditions of hostilities between
nation states. Since World War II, the international community has been
defining crimes of international law that do not depend on conditions of
hostility between nations. But are those offenses triable under U.S. law
in military courts or in the civilian courts? In fact, the international
community has been quite adamant in not defining the acts of terrorists
to be acts of war, lawful or unlawful.
Ex parte Milligan30 is important to the argument for using civilian
courts rather than military courts under U.S. domestic law. In this case,
Milligan's habeas corpus petition was granted by the Supreme Court
unanimously, although the nine Justices disagreed over whether the
162 (1965). Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b), if the alleged contempt involves disrespect of
the judge, then that judge is disqualified from hearing the contempt trial.
28. "Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him
from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the
law of war." Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37.
29. The Court blended U.S. and international law regarding the rules applicable to
unlawful combatants:
Our Government, by thus defining lawful belligerents entitled to be treated as
prisoners of war, has recognized that there is a class of unlawful belligerents
not entitled to that privilege, including those who, though combatants, do not
wear "fixed and distinctive emblems." And by [the predecessor of 10 U.S.C.
§821], Congress has made provision for their trial and punishment by military
commission, according to the "law of war."
Id. at 35.
30. Milligan was arrested in Indiana during the Civil War, charged with conspiracy
before a military commission, convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
defects in the proceedings were constitutional or statutory. Justice Davis,
for the five-vote majority, held that Congress could not authorize the use
of military commissions even for violations of the "laws and usages of
war" in areas outside the "theater of operations" and in which the civilian
courts were open and operating. 31 Chief Justice Chase, for the four-vote
minority, believed that Congress could have authorized the, use of
military commissions under these circumstances but had not done so.
32
Milligan is often read as stating emphatically that it would be
unconstitutional to prosecute citizens in military commissions for crimes
committed in areas in which the civilian courts are open and operating.
There is even stronger language in Beckwith v. Bean,33 a civil case for
false imprisonment under similar facts as Milligan but decided long after
the Civil War was over. In Beckwith, Justice Field delivered a vigorous
31. It can serve no useful purpose to inquire what those laws and usages [of
war] are, whence they originated, where found, and on whom they operate;
they can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority
of the government, and where the courts are open and their process
unobstructed. This court has judicial knowledge that in Indiana the Federal
authority was always unopposed, and its courts always open to hear criminal
accusations and redress grievances; and no usage of war could sanction a
military trial there for any offence whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise
connected with the military service. Congress could grant no such power; and
to the honor of our national legislature be it said, it has never been provoked by
the state of the country even to attempt its exercise. One of the plainest
constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by
a court not ordained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges
appointed during good behavior.
Id. at 121-22.
32. The fact that the Federal courts were open was regarded by Congress as a
sufficient reason for not exercising the power; but that fact could not deprive
Congress of the right to exercise it. Those courts might be open and
undisturbed in the execution of their functions, and yet wholly incompetent to
avert threatened danger, or to punish, with adequate promptitude and certainty,
the guilty conspirators.
It was for Congress to determine the question of expediency. And Congress
did determine it. That body did not see fit to authorize trials by military
commission in Indiana, but by the strongest implication prohibited them.
Id. at 140-41.
Chief Justice Chase went further to deliver a lecture about the role of President
Lincoln and the military officers in these matters:
With that prohibition [by Congress] we are satisfied, and should have remained
silent if the answers to the questions certified had been put on that ground,
without denial of the existence of a power which we believe to be
constitutional and important to the public safety-a denial which, as we have
already suggested, seems to draw in question the power of Congress to protect
from prosecution the members of military commissions who acted in
obedience to their superior officers, and whose action, whether warranted by
law or not, was approved by that up-right and patriotic President under whose
administration the Republic was rescued from threatened destruction.
33. Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 294 (1878).
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lecture about the inability of Congress to suspend the operation of civilian
law even in wartime.34
The Supreme Court in Quirin answered the Milligan argument rather
curtly by pointing out that "Milligan, not being a part of or associated
with the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to
the law of war, save as-in circumstances found not there to be present,
and not involved here-martial law might be constitutionally established.
' 35
In this statement, the Quirin Court observed that Congress had not
established "martial law" in the United States, but the opinion relies
extensively on explaining that these saboteurs had engaged in military
operations out of uniform and had done so by breaching coastal zones
under military command. That their objective was to reach targets within
civilian zones would have made them also subject to civilian court
systems, so we can speculate that there would have been concurrent
jurisdiction by the military and civilian systems and not exclusive
jurisdiction of either.
The implication of these observations is that the "theater of operations,"
in which military commissions could act, was expanded to reach those
areas behind friendly lines in which saboteurs would find it profitable to
operate. From this, one could conclude that the "theater of operations"
in time of armed conflict extends to any target that a saboteur desires to
strike, and from this the act of a terrorist becomes the act of an "enemy
combatant."
But can the President, even with the consent of Congress, authorize
military detention or trial of a U.S. citizen when the civilian courts are
open and operating? Quirin points in the direction of yes, at least when
the United States is in the middle of a declared war and the alleged
perpetrators are captured in the course of attacking U.S. targets. Milligan
says emphatically no, unless the context of national emergency is so
great that there is military necessity for supplanting civilian processes.
Further guidance may be gained from Duncan v. Kahanamoku,36
which struck down the use of military tribunals during a time of "martial
34. No mere order or proclamation of the President for the arrest and imprisonment
of a person not in the military service, in a State removed from the scene of
actual hostilities, where the courts are open and in the unobstructed exercise of
their jurisdiction, can constitute the due process of law, nor can it be made
such by any act of Congress.
Id. at 294.
35. ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. at45.
36. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 304 (1946).
law" in Hawaii following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Duncan was a
"civilian shipfitter employed in the Navy Yard at Honolulu" who
"engaged in a brawl with two armed Marine sentries at the yard." The
military authorities (presumably foregoing a charge of criminal stupidity)
charged him with violation of a standing military order, "assault on
military or naval personnel with intent to resist or hinder them in the
discharge of their duty." At the time, Hawaii was under martial law,
although the civilian courts were open and operating for some purposes.
Duncan was convicted and sentenced by a military tribunal, and the
Supreme Court invalidated his conviction. While recognizing that Congress
had authorized the declaration of martial law in the Hawaii Organic Act,
the Court reviewed the history of military tribunals as it existed at the
time of the Organic Act and concluded that it "was not intended to
authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals.,
37
By relying on congressional intent, the Court in Duncan avoided
constitutional grounds for its decision, but it was clear that the situation
skirted on constitutional issues. Citing Milligan, the Court stated,
We have always been especially concerned about the potential evils of summary
criminal trials and have guarded against them by provisions embedded in the
Constitution itself. Legislatures and courts are not merely cherished American
institutions; they are indispensable to our Government.
Military tribunals have no such standing.
38
Indeed, in something approaching a fit of pique, Justice Black's opinion
referred to the Civil War experience by pointing out that "in order to
prevent this Court from passing on the constitutionality of [Reconstruction]
legislation Congress found it necessary to curtail our appellate jurisdiction."
The Duncan Court was well aware of Quirin, decided just four years
earlier, as well as In re Yamashita,39 decided just weeks earlier. What
the Court said to distinguish these cases, as well as others involving
legitimate use of military tribunals was this:
Our question does not involve the well-established power of the military to
exercise jurisdiction over members of the armed forces, those directly connected
with such forces, or enemy belligerents, prisoners of war, or others charged with
violating the laws of war. We are not concerned with the recognized power of
the military to try civilians in tribunals established as a part of a temporary
military government over occupied enemy territory or territory regained from an
enemy where civilian government cannot and does not function .... Nor need
we here consider the power of the military simply to arrest and detain civilians
interfering with a necessary military function at a time of turbulence and danger
from insurrection or war.
4 °
37. Id. at 324.
38. Id. at 322.
39. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
40. Id. at 322.
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In short, the Court limited the legitimate realm of military tribunals to
governance of the armed forces themselves, the "theater of operations"
(including occupied territory, as Winthrop argued) and "others charged
with violating the laws of war." So once again we come to the question
of whether a person acting without "color of state action" can violate the
law of war.
B. Non-State Actors and the "Law of War"
The Government claims statutory authority in support of the
Commander-in-Chief powers from 10 U.S.C. § 821 (Article 15 of the
UCMJ), which states that creation of military courts-martial by statute
does not "deprive military commissions... of concurrent jurisdiction with
respect to offenders or offenses that ... by the law of war may be tried
by military commissions." The argument from Quirin goes on to assert
that in wartime conditions, military necessity as determined by the
Commander-in-Chief can justify using military tribunals for punishment
of offenses against the law of war. Because a terrorist act (wearing civilian
clothing, targeting a civilian facility, and blending back into a civilian
population) is against the law of war, even in the absence of an
international definition of "terrorism," then the power of the military is
complete.41
The Quirin opinion distinguished Milligan on the ground that
"Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the
enemy, was a non-belligerent." Professors Bradley and Goldsmith argue
that al Qaeda is a sufficiently organized and hostile organization to be
subject to the law of war. "If the September 11 attacks were committed
by traditional state actors during this armed conflict, they would clearly
violate international law prohibitions on attacking civilian populations
and destroying their property. 42 They argue that "there is precedent for
applying the laws of war to groups not directly acting on behalf of
nation-states, such as guerilla groups and insurgents."
Guerrillas and insurgents, however, do not violate the law of war by
the inherent nature of their mission or composition. They may violate
provisions against systematically attacking populations and engaging in
41. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10.
42. Bradley and Goldsmith point out, however, that "isolated or sporadic" attacks
would not violate the law of war because they would not constitute a "state of armed
conflict." Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 257.
armed conflict without appropriate insignia. For specific violations of this
type, the guerilla may be criminally responsible, but it is also possible to
conduct guerilla operations in compliance with the law of war. For
example, the lack of insignia may be justified by defense of home so
long as they limit targets to military ones. Thus, this argument in favor
of allowing military commissions to try offenses committed by terrorists
boils down to equating the terrorist operation to an ongoing state of
armed conflict with a "belligerent" who violates the law of war, or as
often designated in government policy statements, an "illegal enemy
combatant." But a belligerent is not illegal just by being a belligerent.
Professor Paust argues not just from Milligan but also from general
international law as represented by noted scholars43 that the authority of
military commissions is limited to the "theatre of operations" or war-
related occupied territory. Moreover, he points out that granting the status
of "insurgent" or "belligerent" to al Qaeda would have the unintended,
and potentially disastrous, effect of giving them the option of practicing
their terrorist acts in legitimate ways.44 All they would have to do is don
an appropriate insignia, limit their attacks to militarily defined targets,
and they do not commit any crime against the law of war. Of course,
anyone wearing such an insignia could be hunted down and killed
without warning, but they could not be prosecuted for war crimes.
There are two interesting aspects of this argument. One is that there is
another way of looking at Quirin and Milligan, which focuses more on
the role of Congress and "martial law" in keeping with the concurrence
of Chief Justice Chase in Milligan. The other interesting issue has to do
with the terminology. We will consider them in reverse order.
There has been a great deal of sloppiness in the popular press, and
even in some legal writing, around the terms "insurgent," "belligerent,"
and "combatant." A quick explanation of these terms will help explain
why the language of war just does not fit the actions of, or reactions to,
an organized terrorist group. Most of these terms have been designed
for use in determining when it is appropriate for an outside nation to
come to the aid of a group fighting with its own recognized government.
Until now, it has not been necessary to have special terminology for
members of an enemy military.
The terms "rebel" and "rebellion" refer to persons or groups who are
violently opposed to the existing regime within their own country. It is
not legitimate for another nation to come to the aid of a rebellious force.
For this purpose, rebellion "covers minor instances of internal war of a
43. In the European tradition, international law is often contained in scholarly
commentaries more than in legislative documents or court opinions.
44. Paust, supra note 9, at 8 n.l 6; Paust, supra note 18, at 327-28.
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wide variety: violent protest involving a single issue.., or an uprising
that is so rapidly suppressed as to warrant no acknowledgment of its
existence on an international level. 45  The second stage of internal
conflict is "insurgency," which is somewhere between rebellion and
belligerency. The declaration of an activity as insurgency basically protects
other nations and their nationals from being accused of aiding a criminal
faction if they have any contact with the insurgents, such as by doing
business in nonmilitary goods. Only when a group achieves the status of
"belligerent" can other nations come to its aid militarily. A belligerent is
characterized by the ability to control a segment of territory and thus
requires other nations either to choose sides in the conflict or to declare
neutrality between them.
Because the terms "insurgent" and "belligerent" were developed for
use in sorting out the rights and obligations of other nations with respect
to an internal dispute in one nation, they are not suited for use in
instances of open armed conflict between nations. For that purpose,
international law has turned to the concepts of "combatant" and
"noncombatant," along with occasional use of terms such as "camp
follower" and "retainer." Combatants are expected to be in uniform or
otherwise recognizably identified. Noncombatants need not carry any
special insignia but certain facilities such as hospitals and schools are
entitled to even greater protection when they are clearly identified, as are
the medical and religious personnel who wear special symbols so long as
they refrain from any military act.
The U.S. governmental positions of the past year have attempted to
brand everyone connected with al Qaeda an "unlawful enemy combatant."
The potency of this term, if successful, would be enormous. It is the same
as branding someone a spy or war criminal. This term places the accused
squarely within the operation of military law.46 It further triggers
application of the law of war and all its defined criminal behavior, such
as targeting civilian populations.
With the terminology more firmly in mind, let us return to the question of
using military commissions in civilian territory during wartime. The
45. Richard A. Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 185, 198-99 (J. Rosenau ed., 1964).
46. As a matter of internal direction to the Executive Branch, the Military Order
takes away the option of referring a case to the civilian courts by saying that a person
subject to the order "shall be tried only" by military commissions. But the order is
triggered only by a presidential finding that it is applicable to a particular person, so the
option of not certifying a person for that treatment remains available.
concurring opinion in Milligan is sometimes dubbed a dissent because
Chase disagreed vigorously with the constitutional analysis of the majority.
The majority had said that Congress could not authorize military commissions
and the suspension of habeas corpus in areas that were out of the theater
of operations and in which the civilian courts were open and operating.
Chase, on the other hand, argued that Congress could have done so but
had affirmatively chosen not to allow those actions during the Civil War.
The Government now argues that Quirin chose the Chase formulation
and that Congress has provided the necessary authorization.
Chase's opinion, however, deals with declaration of "martial law," not
just with the use of military commissions when martial law has not been
declared. In the absence of application of military law generally to a region,
there is no place for the use of military commissions absent military
action of the type portrayed in Quirin. Colonel Morgan makes this point
vigorously and even Colonel-Professor Winthrop may be read as having
the concept of martial law in mind as a precursor to exercise of the
power claimed for Congress. Certainly, even Winthrop would agree that
Congress would have to declare a national emergency or be unable to act.
As a matter of pure logic, Professor Paust must have the better of the
argument, that the use of military commissions is limited to the theater
of operations. The government's argument that the President can apply
military law and procedures to anyone who engages in "armed attack"
upon the United States would have no limits. Anyone who attacks a
U.S. governmental, military, or even civilian target could be branded an
enemy combatant under this view of plenary military authority. Thus,
the protester who climbs a fence at a U.S. military installation could be
outside the operation of the civilian justice system, a result far beyond
the exigencies of dealing with terrorism.
C. Application of U.S. Law to Alleged Terrorists
Having 6ast at least some doubt on the "jurisdiction" of military
tribunals, we should explore the question of what law applies. Because
picking the tribunal depends in part on what law applies, we need to
know the sources of law that can be applied to terrorists.
Some of the Guantanamo detainees may have been members of al
Qaeda or related terrorist organizations. Some may have been more or
less directly implicated in specific terrorist actions. Because the language of
war was used from the beginning with respect to these detainees, a
widespread perception has been created that the alleged terrorist is to be
dealt with in military fashion. There may even be existing perception
that there is no criminal law to deal with the alleged wrongs of some of
these people. In fact, there is a substantial body of law that applies to
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both citizen and non-citizen alike, to offenses committed on U.S. soil
and to those committed abroad. So before we turn to the military
commission, it would be profitable first to outline the law that could be
applied to an alleged terrorist in the civilian courts.
1. Citizen/Non-citizen Distinctions
For some reason, the Bush administration chose to draw a distinction
between citizens and non-citizens in the Military Order authorizing the
trial of al Qaeda members by military commissions.47 The same distinction
also has been drawn as a practical matter in dealing with the detainees
because the only two known U.S. citizens originally confined in Cuba
were transferred to Virginia, one to be tried in the civilian courts48 and
one to be detained in military isolation.49
Citizenship does matter in this context in one important regard. The
citizen has a constitutionally protected right to enter the United States at
any time,50 whereas the non-citizen has rights of entry only so far as
granted by Congress.5' It may have been a violation of citizenship rights
to have continued confinement of citizens in Cuba, whereas the non-
citizens have no more right to be brought to the United States than to be
taken anywhere else. Their confinement is purely a matter of international
law except to the extent that there is a question of Presidential emergency
power to hold people in confinement to begin with. When we look at
that question below, there may also well be a distinction to be drawn
between citizens and non-citizens on that issue.
Oddly, the citizen/non-citizen distinction has worked the reverse with
regard to persons arrested on U.S. soil. Padilla, a citizen, was sent to
military custody52 while a number of non-citizens arrested on charges of
supporting terrorist activity are pending trial in civilian courts.53 Again,
47. Professor Cole sees this distinction as part of a broad attempt to isolate non-
citizens for unusually harsh treatment reminiscent of Japanese internment. David Cole,
Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002).
48. See Plea Agreement, United States v. John Walker Lindh, at http://news.
findlaw.comihdocs/docs/lindh/uslindh71502pleaag.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2003).
49. See generally, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 1.
50. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 264-65, 268 (1967); Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 144, 184 (1963).
51. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
52. See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
53. Two alleged al Qaeda cells, one in Oregon and one in New York, resulted in
arrests and indictments in the fall of 2002. Those prosecutions are still pending. See
FINDLAW, TERRORISM, CRIMINAL CASES, at http://news.findlaw.comlegalnews/us/terrorism/
the citizen/non-citizen distinction has no function in the context of which
court system will take jurisdiction over the offender, and we are met
with another example of incoherence in government responses to the
terrorism phenomenon.
2. Acts Committed Outside U.S. Territory
It might be thought that there would be a difference between criminal
acts committed on U.S. soil and those committed abroad. This distinction is
material only in a very limited class of cases. The United States, like
most nations, claims extra-territorial jurisdiction to apply its law and
procedures in a variety of settings. Among the possibilities, not always
uniformly applied, are roughly five classes of cases:
54
1. external incidents with effects in U.S. territory;
2. a victim who is a U.S. national;
3. a perpetrator who is a U.S. national;
4. impacts on governmental interests of the United States;
5. "universal" jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, the categories are not spelled out this cleanly in U.S.
statutes or even in the Restatement of Foreign Relations.55 The statute
defining "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction" of the United
States, contains a long list of provisions that have accumulated over the
years and includes several examples of the first four categories by
referring to crimes committed by or against U.S. nationals under certain
circumstances, by detailing offenses committed on the high seas on or
against certain vehicles, and by referring to categories of U.S. possessions.
In some instances, the statute limits application of U.S. law in
extraterritorial settings "to the extent permitted by international law."
This may be a reference to an inherent limitation that no application of
one nation's law is to interfere with the sovereignty of another nation.57
cases/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 214 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Yousef,
927 F. Supp. 673, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 416-23 (2003).
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 402 & 404 (1986). Section 402
relates to "jurisdiction to prescribe" rather than "jurisdiction to adjudicate," but the
principles are often used interchangeably by U.S. courts. The Restatement is vague
about whether either victim or perpetrator status is sufficient as a basis for authority over
extraterritorial crimes because it deals with "activities [or] interests.., of its nationals"
which could encompass either activities of the perpetrator or interests of the victim.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
57. The Restatement expresses this principle by insisting that every application of
national law be tested against the question of whether "exercise of such jurisdiction is
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The federal statute detailing "[a]cts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries" 58 likewise relies on several aspects of U.S. interests, such as
"interstate or foreign commerce," U.S. officials, U.S. property, along with
anything under "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction." For most
crimes of terrorism there will be some offense under U.S. law that can be
charged whenever the terrorism touches our shores or our overseas interests.
The fifth category, "universal jurisdiction," refers to the power of any
nation to punish offenses that transgress against the customary law of
nations. The Restatement describes this as the authority to "define and
prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community
of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on
or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes and perhaps certain acts of
terrorism."9
Universal jurisdiction has been used as the basis for creation of
international tribunals to deal with war crimes in situations when the
persons or state most affected were not viewed by the international
community as being up to the task, such as tribunals created for Rwanda
and Yugoslavia. Virtually the only nation that has avowedly used "universal
jurisdiction" as a heading for its own criminal prosecutions is Israel,
which used the concept to try Nazi leaders for offenses that occurred on
other territory before the State of Israel existed. Historically, universal
jurisdiction could also have been part of the justification for "police
actions" against pirates and slave traders. The Restatement contemplates
this prospect by allowing a nation to "punish noncompliance.., by
police or other nonjudicial action.
' 60
The United States has not made a general claim of universal jurisdiction
regarding any wide classes of offenses, but has instead asserted universal
jurisdiction in isolated provisions scattered throughout its criminal
statutes. Given the expansive reading that can be given to U.S. interests
in such matters as "foreign commerce," however, particularly in the
globalized economy, the issue of universal jurisdiction may be of little
consequence other than as it affects the use of military commissions for
unreasonable" with a list of factors to be considered. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 403 (1986). This formulation may work well in application of civil law but
it is rather loose and vague for application of criminal penalties. Due process may
require more specificity, subject to prosecutorial discretion if a particular prosecution
would offend the interest of another nation.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2003).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1986) (emphasis added).
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401 (1986).
prosecution of a crime "against the law of nations."
Another important question is whether U.S. intrusion into another
nation's territory to apprehend or "punish" an offender is justified under
international law, which could be incorporated into domestic law.
Extradition from another country is subject to any existing treaty
arrangements between the two countries. In most instances, good politics,
more than law, will dictate the wisdom of having either the consent of
that nation or an international sanction, such as U.N. resolution, in place
before any such enforcement action occurs.6  The propriety of using
military force to capture or kill a suspected terrorist in another country is
beyond the scope of this article.
There is ample authority for prosecuting terrorist offenses in the ordinary
civilian justice system. There are literally hundreds of provisions in
Title 18 of the U.S. Code that could be considered when deciding what
criminal offenses to charge in a terrorism case. In addition, federal law
defines a "federal crime of terrorism" as violation of any of 39 statutes
when the "offense is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government
conduct., 62 There are also federal statutes defining offenses of providing
financing for terrorism, providing material support for terrorists, 63 and
providing material support for terrorist organizations. 64
3. Sabotage and Spying
The Quirin opinion relied on historical antecedents stemming from the
exigencies of war-time conditions (essentially battlefield trials of alleged
spies) and from a quid-pro-quo comparison of alleged saboteurs to U.S.
soldiers. We should attempt to determine whether these or similar
considerations apply to alleged members of terrorist organizations and
also whether international law has criminalized terrorist behavior in such
fashion as to indicate what sort of tribunal should conduct the trials.65
61. The Supreme Court has upheld the kidnapping of criminal defendants from other
countries for trial in the United States, at least so long as existing bilateral treaties do not
prohibit that action, without considering whether multilateral treaties or customary
international law could impose limits. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655,
657 (1992); see United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212-13 (11 th Cir. 1997).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g). Interestingly, there is no reference to this definition in
any criminal statute; its only effect is that it is used for enhancement under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1332A. This statute depends on knowledge that funds, shelter, or
goods may be used "in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of' specified
federal crimes of terrorism.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1332B. This statute depends on designation of a particular
organization by the Secretary of State.
65. International law, as developing within tribunals such as the International
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The historic examples used by the Supreme Court in Quirin had the
distinguishing characteristic of having occurred mostly under battlefield
conditions. The Court cited 11 cases of persons convicted as spies by
courts-martial and executed during the Revolutionary War. These proceedings
were conducted under the authority of a Resolution of the Continental
Congress, which was later converted to statutory form. The original
resolution and statute applied to "alien spies." The Court also mentions
seven cases in which there may not have even been a court-martial but
just summary execution by authority of the field commander.
Three persons were tried by courts-martial for spying during the War
of 1812: one was hanged, one acquitted, and the third was convicted but
then "released by President Madison on the ground that he was an
American citizen."
The military commission statute was amended in 1862 to apply not
just to aliens but to any person on the ground that almost all combatants
in the Civil War (and those civilians likely to aid them) were actually
U.S. citizens, and it would not make sense to subject an Englishman to
military justice but not the South Carolinian who was doing the same
thing to the forces of the Union.66 In other words, the enemies were
citizens and the circumstances were indisputably war.
A potentially significant issue arose a year later when the 1863
Conscription Act expanded the areas to which this provision would
extend. From 1775 to 1863, the scope of military jurisdiction extended
to those "lurking as spies in or about the fortifications or encampments
of the armies of the United States." The 1863 Act extended to "in or
about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters, or encampments of any of
the Armies of the United States, or elsewhere." A motion to strike the
phrase "or elsewhere" failed and the language has remained since.67
One other change from the original versions of the spy provision was
made during codification in 1912 when the phrase "shall be triable" was
converted without explanation to "shall be tried." Colonel-Professor
Morgan notes that the change was not even disclosed to Congress when
voting on the codification and that it could remove discretion from the
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, is recognizing that non-state actors can
be held accountable criminally but their actions would not be "war crimes" outside the
context of an "armed conflict."
66. Edmund Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Non-Military Persons
Under the Articles of War, 4 MINN. L. REV. 79, 109 (1920).
67. Id. at 110.
executive branch to take either the military course or the civilian course
of trial for treason.68
a. Citizen Spies and Alien Spies
Colonel-Professor Morgan argues forcefully that it is within Congress'
power to subject a citizen spy to the same military authority as the alien
spy. Congress has the power to raise an army, to define offenses against
the law of nations, and to make rules and regulations for the governance
of the military. So far as jury trial is concerned, there is pre-Constitution
precedent for treating the offense of spying as "arising within the land
and naval forces," and therefore exempted by the Sixth Amendment.
Morgan believed that the more important issue was the breadth of the
power to subject a citizen to court-martial, the issue raised in the
addition of the phrase "or elsewhere" in 1863. He was writing in 1920
with reference to the conditions of World War I and noted that much of
the nation was mobilized for the war effort by making and supplying
everything from munitions to food and clothing, while also keeping open
channels of communication and transportation on which the military
would rely along with the rest of the country. "Under such circumstances,
the zone of operations in truth and in fact comprehends the entire
country. 69
The "zone of operations" was an attempt to distinguish the act of
spying from that of tourism. What is it that makes gathering information
punishable by death? In the 18th and 19th centuries, military encampments
and posts were easily identifiable and there was little motivation to
gather information about those encampments other than for nefarious
reasons. Conversely, there was little motivation for anyone to attack
anything else and so no proscription on gathering information about
civilian establishments. In the context of World War I, when Morgan
was writing, and even more so during World War II, when the entire
industrial complex was mobilized for support of the war effort, the zone
of operations could have been significantly blurred.
Colonel Morgan, however, remained unconvinced. He asserted that
the citizen spy is engaged in treason, which must be tried in the civilian
courts with a jury, unless "in the theatre of operations or any other area
subject to the actual control and dominion of the military." Only in this
way can the act be deemed to "arise in the land or naval forces." He
conceded that modem conditions of armaments and supply were moving
toward a day when the "zone of operations [could] include the entire
68. Id. atn.112.
69. Id. at 115.
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area of a belligerent country." Referring to Milligan, however, he believed
that the term should be limited to the "theatre of actual hostilities, the
lines of communication, and the reserves and service of supply under
actual military control, and that it cannot properly be enlarged to cover
the farms, factories and workshops under exclusively civilian control. 7 °
The counter position to Colonel-Professor Morgan was the opinion of
Colonel-Professor Wambaugh, who wrote as Judge Advocate General
that the civilian spy was punishable by death as a threat to military
operations. 71 In fact, Colonel-Professor Wambaugh asserted that a spy is
not a criminal unless a citizen. The alien spy, he claimed, might actually
be engaged in a brave and honorable act but is still shot because of the
threat to the military, just as a soldier in uniform would be shot without
the luxury even of martial trial. To Wambaugh, the concept of a treasonous
crime which could also be the subject of a court-martial noncrime was
not disturbing. To Morgan, however, the crime of treason was so heavily
protected by constitutional prescriptions of trial by jury and evidence,
that only an act within the immediate vicinity of military control could
justify abandoning those prescriptions.
The debate between Colonel-Professors Morgan and Wambaugh is
instructive for the proposition that almost a century ago experts were
already beginning to realize that time of war could involve most of a
belligerent country. But even then, at least some voices were heard to
argue for recourse to the civilian courts. The reasons advanced had to do
with constitutional guarantees. The heart of the matter seems to have
been that there are such significant constitutional guarantees surrounding
the crime of "treason" that it would be foolhardy to bypass those
guarantees by remitting the accused to military power.
In addition to constitutional guarantees, I would add the thought that it
is critically important to the national psyche today to see our civilian
processes as up to the task of defending our freedoms, both physical
freedom and legal civil liberties, If the terrorist can change our way of
life, then we have lost. Moreover, the offense of spying exists under
military law only in time of war. Information gathering for the purpose
of destroying a building or taking life during peacetime may be an act in
furtherance of a conspiracy to commit murder or other crimes, but it is
not spying. Here is a clear example of the importance of deciding what
70. Id. at 116.
71. Id. at 113 (The Wambaugh discussion is from a governmental memorandum as
quoted by Morgan).
it means to be at war or whether there is some other status between war
and peace.
b. Citizen Saboteurs and Suppliers of the Enemy
The prior section dealt with the phenomenon of spying, which essentially
consists of gathering information. Curiously enough, it was the basis for
the Court's decision in Quirin with regard to planned sabotage. The
person who already has information on where to plant a bomb and is
captured with explosives in hand may not be a spy. He may be bent on
murder or destruction of property, but the principal reason that the
language of spying has been borrowed is that he is moving clandestinely
and out of uniform toward his target. That may make him an unlawful
combatant under the international law of war, but he must be considered
a combatant (not a spy) when engaged in military action for an entity
engaged in "armed conflict."
There is another provision in the UCMJ that should be considered in
fleshing out our picture. Article 104 declares that "any person who
aids ... the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or other
things ... shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court martial
or military commission may direct. 72 If we carried the Wambaugh
theory to this provision, then supplying of money to "charities" that aid a
terrorist organization might subject an individual to trial by military
commission if "enemy" were read to apply outside the context of "armed
conflict."
We are not entirely without precedent for construction of this
provision. In several cases in the post-Civil War era involving persons
trading with Indians, it became apparent that the principal difficulty
would be in determining when a "state of war" existed with a particular
tribe or band. The Attorney General declared that this section could be
triggered when there were armed conflicts occurring between those
73tribes and U.S. military forces. It might be tempting to assert that a
state of hostility between the United States and a group of people such as
al Qaeda is similar to the conditions of hostility with some Indian tribes
in the late 19th Century. The analogy fails, however, on a couple of
fronts. First, a particular Indian tribe would be defined by a common
ethnic and cultural heritage vastly more homogeneous than is likely to
exist within most terrorist groups.74 Secondly, although Indian tribes did
72. 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2000).
73. Unlawful Traffic with Indians, 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 470 (1871); see WILLIAM
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 86, 101, 103 (2d ed. 1920).
74. Although many terrorist groups share common ethnic, religious, and cultural
bonds, any particular group may also recruit from outside these bonds. Al Qaeda appears to
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not attempt to stake out very precise borders of their territory, they
clearly had claims of right to areas that constituted their homelands.
Thirdly, a point that is of much greater significance than might be
imagined, the Indian tribes can be considered similar to nation-states for
the simple reason that the European settlers regarded them as at least
resembling nations for purposes of international dealings, for example,
in treaty negotiations and cession of territory.75
4. Treason and its Derivatives
The law of treason has not been widely studied in a very long time, but
it may offer us some interesting insights. The Framers were so concerned
about the potential misuse of treason charges that this is the only "crime"
which is given special treatment in the Constitution.76 The Treason Clause
builds extremely high barricades against prosecution for this "heinous"
crime, so the question becomes whether those barricades can be circumvented
by creating other crimes, or by calling the traitor something else such as
an "enemy combatant." To be grossly flippant, could we avoid restrictions
on prosecution for treason by calling it jaywalking? The answer turns
out to be yes, we can! But there is nothing to indicate that we can avoid
conducting public trials for jaywalking.
Article HI's "peculiar phraseology observable in the definition of'
treason, and "the equally stringent feature" requiring two eyewitness'
testimony of the same overt act, have been said to flow from the
Framers' discomfort with "abuses ... under the tyrannical reigns of the
Tudors and the Stuarts. In particular, the Framers were reacting to
the concept of "constructive treason" by which anyone who spoke in
support of, or was friendly with those who expressed, resistance to
policies of the Crown could be accused of treason. Indeed, it is not
likely that even the Tudors and Stuarts would have had an easy time of
have been extremely successful in recruiting from a number of cultures. See JOHN
COOLEY, UNHOLY WARS: AFGHANISTAN, AMERICA AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 66-
85 (3d ed., 2002).
75. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 374-375 (1980); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
76. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No
Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
77. Charge to Grand Jury Treason, 30 F. Cas. No. 18, 271, 1034,1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1861).
tossing a citizen into jail indefinitely on the mere say-so of a military
officer. That they did so on occasion led directly to our constitutional
language preventing the possibility.
Is it possible to square this history with the "enemy combatant" concept
employed by the Supreme Court in Quirin and leading to the Bush
Military Order? The answer is "not very easily," and the lessons to be
learned are not very clear. The Treason Clause creates two categories of
treason: levying war against the United States, and providing aid and
comfort to the enemy. The first requires an armed assemblage and the
second requires an enemy.
Chief Justice Marshall gave us our first instruction in the operation of
the Treason Clause in Ex parte Bollman,78 dealing with some of the
alleged conspirators in the Burr escapade. Some of his discussion is so
pertinent that it is set out at length below.79 Marshall distinguished
78. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 112 (1807).
79. To constitute that specific crime for which the prisoners now before the
court have been committed, war must be actually levied against the United
States. However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force
the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to
levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offences. The first must be
brought into operation by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in
itself, or the fact'of levying war cannot have been committed. So far has this
principle been carried, that, in a case reported by Ventris, and mentioned in
some modem treatises on criminal law, it has been determined that the actual
enlistment of men to serve against the government does not amount to levying
war. It is true that in that case the soldiers enlisted were to serve without the
realm, but they were enlisted within it, and if the enlistment for a treasonable
purpose could amount to levying war, then war had been actually levied.
It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty of
this crime who has not appeared in arms against his country. On the contrary,
if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the
purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any
part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who
are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors.
But there must be an actual assembling of men for the treasonable purpose, to
constitute a levying of war.
Crimes so atrocious as those which have for their object the subversion by
violence of those laws and those institutions which have been ordained in order
to secure the peace and happiness of society, are not to escape punishment
because they have not ripened into treason. The wisdom of the legislature is
competent to provide for the case; and the framers of our constitution, who not
only defined and limited the crime, but with jealous circumspection attempted
to protect their limitation by providing that no person should be convicted of it,
unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on
confession in open court, must have conceived it more safe that punishment in
such cases should be ordained by general laws, formed upon deliberation,
under the influence of no resentments, and without knowing on whom they
were to operate, than that it should be inflicted under the influence of those
passions which the occasion seldom fails to excite, and which a flexible
definition of the crime, or a construction which would render it flexible, might
bring into operation. It is therefore more safe as well as more consonant to the
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strongly between treason and conspiracy: "However flagitious may be
the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of our
country, such conspiracy is not treason." It must be remembered, however,
that the Burr escapade did not involve a foreign enemy, so there was no
occasion for him to deal with the offense of providing aid and comfort to
the enemy.
Marshall went on to deal with our very question. Although "to complete
the crime of levying war against the United States, there must be an
actual assemblage of men for the purpose of executing a treasonable
design," he expressed the view that the legislature could define other
offenses to which the strictures of the Treason Clause would not apply.
The Framers were concerned about the passions that the thought of
treason would engender, but they could have been comfortable with the
thought that "crimes not clearly within the constitutional definition,
should receive such punishment as the legislature in its wisdom may
provide."
In a number of cases stemming from the Civil War, the judges expanded
Marshall's view of conspiracy to state that there could be no such
concept as an accessory to treason because an act was either treason or
not.80 They consistently recognized the differences between the two kinds
of treason, the first depending on whether the defendant has taken up
arms, 81 the second consisting of providing material support to a
recognized enemy. It is familiar ground that President Lincoln attempted to
use the military courts for prosecution of Southern sympathizers, leading
eventually to the opinion in Milligan. For the remainder of the story, we
become embroiled in the tripartite struggle for power among the
principles of our constitution, that the crime of treason should not be extended
by construction to doubtful cases; and that crimes not clearly within the
constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature in
its wisdom may provide.
To complete the crime of levying war against the United States, there must be
an actual assemblage of men for the purpose of executing a treasonable design.
In the case now before the court, a design to overturn the government of the
United States in New-Orleans by force, would have been unquestionably a
design which, if carried into execution, would have been treason, and the
assemblage of a body of men for the purpose of carrying it into execution would
amount to levying of war against the United States; but no conspiracy for this
object, no enlisting of men to effect it, would be an actual levying of war.
Id. at 126-27.
80. United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. No. 15,254, 18, 22 (C.C. Cal. 1863).
81. Id. at 21; see Charges to Grand Juries collected at 30 F. Cas. No. 18, 270-73
(1863).
President (Andrew Johnson), the Court (Taney, then Chase), and Congress
(Radical Republican by 1865). In Thorington v. Smith,82 the Court dealt
with the question of whether debts payable in Confederate currency were
still valid as between two individuals (and, thus, payable in U.S.
currency after the war ended). Chief Justice Chase distinguished among
different levels of de facto governments. At one extreme would be a
solidly established actual government such that "adherents to it in war
against the government de jure do not incur the penalties of treason."
The government of the Confederacy, he said, was sufficiently
established that it obtained "actual supremacy, however unlawfully
gained, in all matters of government within its military lines."
That supremacy did not justify acts of hostility to the United States. How far it
should excuse them must be left to the lawful government upon the re-
establishment of its authority. But it made obedience to its authority, in civil
and local matters, not only a necessity but a duty. Without such obedience, civil
order was impossible.
83
By this language, Chase was implying that there could be no prosecution
for providing aid and comfort to the enemy by a person residing within
the military control of the Confederacy. As we know, there were no
such prosecutions. Moreover, when Congress attempted to punish
former active rebels by forfeiture of their property, the President decreed
that a Presidential pardon worked to prevent forfeiture and the Court
sided with the President.84 There is little more that we can make of the
Civil War experience with regard to the ability of Congress to decree
punishment for the sympathizers and supporters of foreign enemies, so
we now fast-forward to World War I.
The seminal case in First Amendment law is Schenck v. United
States.85 Schenck and his cohorts were convicted of conspiracy to
violate the Espionage Act of 1917, which made it unlawful to "cause
insubordination ... in the military and naval forces of the United States,
and to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United
States." Justice Holmes' famous opinion for the Court, after using the
analogy of "falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater," stated:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could
82. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1 (1869).
83. Id. at I1.
84. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
85. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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regard them as protected by any constitutional right. It seems to be admitted
that if an actual obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for
words that produced that effect might be enforced. The statute of 1917 in § 4
punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as actual obstruction. If the act,
(speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which it is
done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants
making the act a crime.
Before Schenck was decided, Congress had already responded to the
emerging level of dissension regarding U.S. entry into the war in Europe
by passing the 1918 amendments to the Espionage Act. Under the
amendments, it was unlawful to "urge, incite, or advocate" actions that
could disrupt the war effort.86 The majority of the Court found that an
intent to disrupt the war effort was sufficient to uphold conviction under
the statute. Justice Holmes, joined by Brandeis, dissented with the
famous "marketplace of ideas" analysis. The combination of opinions
sounds as if the majority justices were treating the statute as if it were a
finding by Congress of "clear and present danger." The interesting point
for our purposes is that nobody questioned whether Congress could
define crimes that came very close to "providing aid and comfort to the
enemy" without requiring two witnesses to the same overt act. It seems
that at this stage, Congress and the Court had accepted Chief Justice
Marshall's invitation to Congress to define non-treason offenses.
The only World War II case in the Supreme Court on the subject of
treason was Cramer v. United States,87 a follow-up to Quirin. One of the
eight German saboteurs, Thiel, had a friend in the United States named
Cramer, who was German by birth and a naturalized U.S. citizen. Thiel
contacted Cramer in New York, met with him twice in public places, and
gave Cramer some money to hold for him. Cramer testified that he
suspected Thiel was here as a propagandist for the German government,
86. Each of the first three counts charged the defendants with conspiring, when the
United States was at war with the Imperial Government of Germany, to unlawfully utter,
print, write and publish: In the first count, "disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language
about the form of Government of the United States;" in the second count, language
"intended to bring the form of Government of the United States into contempt, scorn,
contumely and disrepute;" and in the third count, language "intended to incite, provoke
and encourage resistance to the United States in said war." The charge in the fourth
count was that the defendants conspired "when the United States was at war with the
Imperial German Government ... unlawfully and wilfully, by utterance, writing, printing
and publication, to urge, incite and advocate curtailment of production of things and
products, to wit, ordnance and ammunition, necessary and essential to the prosecution of
the war." The offenses were charged in the language of the act of Congress.
87. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
but there was no evidence that Cramer suspected anything of the violent
intentions of the saboteurs. Cramer was convicted of treason. 88 The basic
question presented to the Supreme Court was whether an overt act in
furtherance of treason needed to be done with intent by the defendant of
furthering enemy action against the government, or whether an innocent
overt act could be treasonous because of its role in the enemy's plan.
Justice Jackson's majority opinion in Cramer has received surprisingly
little attention. 89 He canvassed the history of treason prosecutions from
English law through the colonial era, pointing out that much of the
turbulence of those periods could lead to a citizen's being caught between
competing loyalties and thus subject to treason charges from two
different sides. The Framers built protections against treason prosecutions
to guard against two dangers: "(1) perversion by established authority to
repress peaceful political opposition; and (2) conviction of the innocent
as a result of perjury, passion or inadequate evidence." 90 The critical
passage for definition of criminal behavior is this:
Thus the crime of treason consists of two elements: adherence to the enemy; and
rendering him aid and comfort. A citizen intellectually or emotionally may favor the
enemy and harbor sympathies or convictions disloyal to this country's policy or
interest, but so long as he commits no act of aid and comfort to the enemy, there is
no treason. On the other hand, a citizen may take actions which do aid and comfort
the enemy-making a speech critical of the government or opposing its measures,
profiteering, striking in defense plants or essential work, and the hundred other
things which impair our cohesion and diminish our strength-but if there is no
adherence to the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no treason.
9 1
Applying these thoughts to the evidence, Jackson pointed out that the
prosecution had "withdrawn" the safekeeping of money as an overt act
to be submitted to the jury.92 That left only the two meetings with Thiel
that were corroborated by eyewitness testimony. These could not be said
to have shown furtherance of a scheme sufficient to prove either aid or
adherence to the enemy. By contrast, the money transaction, if proved by
88. Former 18 U.S.C. §1 is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §2381:
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or
adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States
or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned
not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $ 10,000; and
shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.
89. Shepard's lists only 20 judicial "analyses" of the opinion and only 115 "citing
decisions" in the 58 years since it was issued.
90. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 27.
91. Id. at 29.
92. We can speculate that there were neither two eyewitnesses to this act nor a
"confession in open court." Cramer's testimony described the money transaction while
denying that he knew the purpose of the money or the purpose of Thiel's presence in the
United States. Id. at 5.
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the requisite testimony, would have made "a quite different case."93 Finally,
Justice Jackson addressed the Government's arguments for relaxing the
standards related to treason:
The Government has urged that our initial interpretation of the treason clause
should be less exacting, lest treason be too hard to prove and the Government
disabled from adequately combating the techniques of modern warfare. But the
treason offense is not the only nor can it well serve as the principal legal
weapon to vindicate our national cohesion and security. In debating this
provision, Rufus King observed to the Convention that the "controversy relating
to Treason might be of less magnitude than was supposed; as the legislature
might punish capitally under other names than Treason." His statement holds
good today. Of course we do not intimate that Congress could dispense with
the two-witness rule merely by giving the same offense another name. But the
power of Congress is in no way limited to enact prohibitions of specified acts
thought detrimental to our wartime safety.
94
Congress, with the assistance of many subsequent administrations, has
accepted this invitation by enacting many statutes that relate to providing
aid and comfort to those who threaten the public safety of the United
States. Perhaps the most directly relevant are those that criminalize
"Providing material support to terrorists"95 and "Providing material support
or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations. 96 There are
also crimes, such as those confessed by John Walker Lindh, defined as
violations of Presidential directives blocking trading with, or providing
services to, regimes designated in time of national emergency.97 Given the
history of the Treason Clause, and particularly Justices Marshall's and
Jackson's invitations to Congress, there can be little doubt about the
validity of these statutes, except insofar as they might in some situations
be subject to First Amendment restrictions.
But does the ability of Congress to define crimes other than treason
extend to the ability of the military to imprison either with or without
trial? There is no hint in any of this that the normal processes of the
93. Id. at 39.
94. Id. at 45.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2000) ("knowing or intending that they are to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [specified federal crimes], or in
preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment or an escape from the commission of
any such violation").
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000) ("knowingly provides material support or resources
to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so").
97. It is a crime to violate a presidential directive of this nature. 50 U.S.C. §
1705(b) (2000), The designation of the Taliban regime as off-limits to American citizens
was effective January 1, 2001 under 31 C.F.R. § 545.204 (2001).
civilian justice system should not apply to crimes undermining the
public safety just because there are foreign connections to the crime.
D. Global Federalism-Ku Klux Klan and al Qaeda
Under current federal law, the use of military commissions for trial of
alleged terrorists depends on finding that an alleged offense constitutes a
violation of the "law of war.",98 More generally, the question of whether
to apply military law to terrorism implies other questions that are
important for those who wish to believe that the international arena has
developed coherent norms for the conduct of warfare, questions such as:
With whom are we at war? What are the rules of engagement for a war
that is against an ideological group rather than a national group?
It is no accident that the history of the United States is roughly
contemporaneous with the development of modern international law, a
development that was fueled by the European Age of Colonialism and
its demise.99 For most of that history, international law has been seen as
rules or norms that pertain to relations among nations, states, or
belligerents.°° Until recently, the world has held to a dichotomous distinction
between the processes of warfare and those of the civilian criminal
system. War was something that took place between state parties, involved
an effort to kill or capture enemy combatants, and thus provided no
occasion for making considered judgments about culpability in the heat
of combat. 1 1 By contrast, those who were suspected of committing
98. The Bush Military Order cites statutory authority, which states that the UCMJ
provisions "conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions,
provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders
or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions,
provost courts, or other military tribunals." 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2002) (emphasis added).
99. The rules pertaining to war can be traced almost to prehistory through
Leviticus in the Middle East and Sun Tzu in the Far East. St. Augustine amplified on the
Hebraic traditions with his concepts of just war, outlining rules both for entry into war
and conduct of war. But the modem version, which depends on the concept of nation
state, begins with Grotius and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. As the European nation
states fanned out around the globe in search of adventure and resources, they would
bump into each other in primitive locations and needed rules to govern their behavior so
as not to alienate other nation states who could cause them difficulties in other locations.
Thus, the Age of Colonialism fueled the effort to codify the "understandings and
practices of civilized nations." A concise summary of this history is contained in THE LAW
OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY-VOLUME I, at 3-15 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
100. The exclusive focus on nation-state participation in international law has been
modified by the emergence of additional organizations as world players, such as
Regional Organizations (e.g., NATO, EU, OAS) and Non-Governmental Organizations
(e.g., Amnesty International, International Red Cross). Although these additional actors
are participants in the development of international law, there are only a few instances of
treaties that specifically recognize their role as legal actors.
101. The rules of engagement of a particular military action eliminate the soldier's
need to inquire into the culpability of someone in uniform carrying arms. But those rules
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crimes against the law of a nation were treated as individuals whose
culpability must be judged in an individualized proceeding.
The lines between warfare and criminal processes have blurred because
of changes in approach both by the enforcers of peace and the
perpetrators of violence. The peacemakers have attempted to use processes
patterned from criminal law to punish violations of respected rules of
warfare, 10 2 while the perpetrators of violence have acted on their own
outside the confines of government and those same rules of warfare.
The world's search for a new paradigm to deal with these phenomena
has produced international commissions for prosecution of war crimes,
0 3
and the global community is now engaged in defining responses to
terrorism.104
The United States and Israel disagreed over whether the Egyptian
expatriate who shot three people at the El Al counter at the Los Angeles
International Airport [hereinafter LAX] was a terrorist. 0 5 The nations of
the world were at odds for decades over the definition of terrorist and
whether terrorism constituted a crime under international law. U.N.
General Assembly and Security Council resolutions have now resolved
the basic proposition but leave open numerous definitional issues. The
familiar theme that "one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter"
cannot authorize violence against noncombatants. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW
AND PRECEDENTS 778 (2d ed. 1920) ("The State is represented in active war by its
contending army, and the laws of war justify killing or disabling of members of the one
army by those of the other in battle or hostile operations.").
102. The trials at Nuremberg were intended to import the processes of law onto the
international scene for dealing with war crimes. Prior to that time, "victor's justice" had
been meted out at the national level. Gerry J. Simpson, A Critical Introduction, in THE
LAW OF WAR CRIMES 5 (McCormack & Simpson eds., 1997).
103. For a specific discussion of the significance of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for
Rwanda & Yugoslavia, see Christopher Blakesley, Atrocity and its Prosecution, in THE
LAW OF WAR CRIMES 189 (McCormack & Simpson eds., 1997).
104. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
G.A. Res. 54, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 160, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109
(1999). International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, June 3, 1983, 1316
U.N.T.S. 206.
105. "American and Israeli officials initially appeared to disagree on Thursday
about whether Mr. Hadayet's rampage should be called a terrorist attack. But it became
clear today that the difference was really over what constitutes terrorism. Yuval Rotem,
Israel's consul general in Los Angeles, said that even a lone individual attacking an
Israeli target like the El Al ticket counter should be considered a terrorist. But F.B.I.
officials said that only if Mr. Hadayet was linked to a terrorist organization would
American investigators call it that, rather than a hate crime." Rick Lyman & Nick Madigan,
Officials Puzzled About Motive of Airport Gunman Who Killed Two, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2002, at Al.
has muddled the issue enormously. 0 6 As numerous authors have pointed
out, this is an almost silly argument because universal law criminalizes
attacks on civilian populations without regard to the political motivations of
the actor. 0 7 The difficulty is not whether there could be justification
for an attack on civilians because legally there cannot be. The difficulty is
in determining by what process to respond to such an attack depending
on the degree of affiliation by the actor with a nation-state.
What distinguishes the "terrorist" from the ordinary street criminal
with ties to an international criminal organization? Take, for instance, a
murder committed on the streets of an American city by a drug dealer
who knows in some vague way that his livelihood is linked to a well-
organized and well-funded cartel in Colombia or Afghanistan. Is this an
act of terrorism? Is it an act of war? Is the United States justified in
invading Colombia because there are organized criminals there who
carry out violence on U.S. civilians? This has been the theme of at least
two recent movies, 0 8 both carrying the message that U.S. involvement
in Colombia would be permissible only with the permission of the
Colombian government, certainly the correct answer under international
law. Meanwhile, international law is creating cooperative efforts to deal
with the transborder aspects of large criminal organizations without
promoting intrusion into the internal affairs of any one nation. 0 9
On the global stage, what distinguishes Jose Padilla from Timothy
McVeigh? Assuming the facts as disclosed in press releases about Padilla,
both men were motivated by extreme hatred for the U.S. government,
and both were planning mass civilian casualties at governmental centers.
Padilla was in league with foreign citizens, but what does this signify?
How do we distinguish him from alleged Mafiosi, or drug dealers in
106. The argument alludes to the difficulties of small dissident groups in fighting
against repressive regimes and attempts to lend legitimacy to the use of violence by
persons who operate clandestinely. The key distinction between freedom fighters and
terrorists, however, for most people is the targeting of civilian populations.
107. Harmon at 188-96. As Harmon also points out, the habit of inflicting violence
on civilians is not easy for a group to break and terrorist organizations gaining control of
political power often continue their patterns of abuse.
108. "Clear and Present Danger" and "Collateral Damage."
109. The United Nations' Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention is charged
with coordinating efforts with respect to organized crime as well as terrorism. Its
principal mandate is the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. "In the
new global age, borders have opened up, trade barriers have fallen and information
speeds around the world at the touch of a button. Business is booming-and so is
transnational organized crime. Fortunes are being made from drug trafficking, prostitution,
illegal firearms and a host of other cross-border crimes. Every year, organized crime
groups launder huge amounts of money in illegal proceeds. These large criminal groups
often mimic legitimate business by forming multinational alliances to extend their reach
and push up profits." Organized Crime, at http://www.undoc.org/undoc/organized-
crime.html?id=l 1704 (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
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league with Colombian cartels?
The difficulty in remitting Padilla, or even Hamdi, to the military is not
just that the Supreme Court has expressed distrust of military tribunals,
which it certainly has, but also that the law abhors incoherence, If there is
no rational distinguishing principle among these examples, and if the choice
of military or civilian trial is pure executive whim, then we are left with
unbridled executive discretion that is more than just uncomfortable, it at
least verges on a level of incoherence that due process itself would prevent.
The post Civil War federalism experience of the United States offers
some very sensible guidance at this point. Indeed, for this author, the
current situation on a global scale makes the concerns of that era much more
readily understandable than they had been to this point. For 150 years, the
federal courts have struggled with criminal, civil rights and conspiracy
statutes that make federal jurisdiction over an incident turn on whether the
actor acted "under color of state law." In some instances, the Ku Klux Klan
[hereinafter KKK] or related miscreants were sufficiently aligned with local
governmental officials to make this finding, while in others the "private
citizen" could escape federal jurisdiction for lack of any connection to a
governmental official or agency. Given the power of racial discrimination,
particularly in the South through at least the 1960s, it was very difficult for
many to understand why the govemrnmental connection needed to be made.
Now I, for one, can see the point.
The Reconstruction statutes created two classes of federal crimes for
interference with "any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution
or laws of the United States," those committed "under color of law" l 0 and
those committed by combination of two or more persons."'
110. Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession,
or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different
punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by
reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens ....
18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000).
111. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised
the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege so secured.
18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000).
The "color of law" provision came safely within the "state action"
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was in turn an
expression that the federal government operated on the states and not
directly on the citizenry at large." 2 The conspiracy statute, however,
presented a bit of a conundrum. If the Fourteenth Amendment operated
only against the states, how could Congress criminalize private
behavior? The few cases actually using this criminal provision thus far
have found either that the perpetrators were acting "in concert" with
state officials or acted in direct contravention of defined federal
interests, such as federal instrumentalities of commerce."
3
Many commentators, and some Justices of the Supreme Court, have
thought that these limitations were unduly restrictive of federal power.
In particular, because the statutes arose out of widespread concern over
the lack of state enforcement against the KKK, it could be argued that
the federal government should be able to criminalize any behavior that
has an impact on racial minorities. 114
With the international experience with terrorism in mind, perhaps it
makes more sense to realize that the difficulty with federalizing crime is
essentially one of line-drawing. Without some "color of state law" or a
federally-defined right at stake, how does one distinguish the KKK
"terrorist" from the ordinary street criminal who also carries racial
animosity for his victims?
The primary federal interest in the post-Civil War Era was the
unwillingness of state governments to take steps to enforce the law
against the KKK or similar groups. The resulting violence against U.S.
citizens (newly defined as such by the Fourteenth Amendment) gave rise
to a collective interest among other states to enforce legal controls
against state-sanctioned violence. The primary federal interest in the
KKK or similar groups today lies in the greater psychological (as well as
physical) impact of a large, concerted, organized group with common
means of carrying out their hostility.
Identical statements can be made with regard to terrorism. The
international interest in terrorism lies in the greater psychological (as
well as physical) impact of a large, concerted, organized group with
common means of carrying out their hostility. The international community
is based in a respect for the individual sovereignty of nations that is even
112. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
113. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (concerted action through
defendants' "causing arrests" plus private interference with federal right to travel);
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (state officials were defendants); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (state officials).
114. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 774-86 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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greater than that of the federal respect for state sovereignty in the United
States. Given that respect, international law does not need to intrude
into the internal affairs of a nation to deal with ordinary street criminals.
It is when a large, organized and well-funded group appears on the scene
with the means to wreak widespread psychological and physical harm
that the international interest is triggered. This leads to the international
corollary of federally-defined offenses: either when the actor is clothed
with some semblance of "state authority" or the conspiracy is sufficiently
large to be a concern of the international community.
Under this view, an act may be a personal act of "terrorism" (as in the
Israeli view of the LAX shooter) without triggering the international
concern of "terrorism" for lack of state involvement or lack of a well-
organized group identity. This is the position taken by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in the case of the LAX shooter and it makes a
great deal of sense from the international perspective.
To carry out the analogy, consider the case of John Paul Franklin, who
acted alone in shooting two white men who were in the company of two
African-American women and who also engaged in other racially-
motivated behavior." 5 Should he have been charged with a federal crime or
left to the state criminal justice system? This is a very close case in U.S.
law. For the federal government to intervene might imply an unhealthy
lack of respect for state justice, but for the federal government to ignore
the situation could be seen as expressing a lack of concern for the racial
issues of the country. In the end, it may have been the flamboyance of
Franklin's racial attitudes that tipped the scales to federal prosecution
because of the potential contagion of his racism, but the federal nexus of
authority was the "use of public facilities" by the victims. 
1 6
Crimes of violence often carry racial overtones. It is often impossible
to say that any one motivation is the sole force in driving a person to
violence. Any ordinary street crime may have an element of racial hostility
buried within it. For the federal government to pick and choose those
that it will prosecute, without any guiding principle for its decisions,
would be contrary to the rationality that we demand of our criminal justice
system. Thus, distinctions in American civil rights law that depend on
"state action" (state sponsorship would be the analogy in terrorism) or
"conspiracy" (a large terrorist organization) make sense from the point
115. United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1983).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000).
of view of importing rationality into what might otherwise become
decisions based on whim, or the identity of the victim, or even the color
of the defendant's skin.
This line of analogy leads in the field of terrorism to considering a
terrorist act to be a violation of the "law of war" only if carried out with
state sanction. It might also be a violation of international law (the "law
of nations") but that only serves to provide universal jurisdiction for the
courts of any nation; it does not indicate which court system within the
U.S. structure should take jurisdiction. For that, we need a rational
distinction such as state sponsorship or participation.
Now the use of the "color of state law" requirement in the post-Civil
War legislation begins to make more sense. The limitation of federal
power to actors who were in league with governmental agents was a
very rational way of confining the operation of law. Similarly, limiting
application of military authority to actors who are in league with foreign
governmental agents during a state of war is a rational limiting principle,
one that courts can apply with some level of confidence.
There is another limiting principle available, but we must wonder whether
the courts can apply it with the requisite level of confidence. The most
likely limit is that of "member of a terrorist organization," which imports
criteria of political motivation, organized group behavior, and funding
capabilities to reach international targets. If Congress plainly authorized
military tribunals for actors who meet these criteria, and if the government
was willing to show to a court in habeas corpus that an individual meets
these criteria, it is likely that the court will accede to the government's
demand for military authority. To claim that the courts have no review
power over these criteria is utterly disingenuous. Even in Quirin the courts
received evidence of the behavior of the German saboteurs showing that
they were acting under direction and in the service of a foreign enemy.
Thus, by foregoing the claim of immunity from habeas corpus review,
the government can construct an argument that an individual falls within
the modern definition of pirate-i.e., a terrorist. We should not, however,
confuse the subject by using the language of war. These people are not
combatants in armed conflict between nations. They are in a category of
criminal that arguably places them within the domain of the military, but
they are also criminals who could be referred to the ordinary processes
of the civilian justice system.
The difficulty is that the only statutory basis for military tribunals at
this point is "violation of the law of war." And just as the KKK did not
violate federal law if not acting "under color of state law," on the world
stage a terrorist does not violate the law of war unless acting "under
color of state authority." How else can we distinguish the terrorist from
the mafiosi?
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It is at this stage that Professor Paust is most persuasive. The whole
message of the Western world to the rest of the world is that democratic
civilian processes are better than a mere show of force. A critical factor
in being "better" is the rationality by which different handling of different
cases can be explained by public policies. Another factor is the transparent
fairness of civilian systems of justice with attendant due process.
Although the current state of law might justify acceptance of the
argument that the terrorist should be subject to military justice, it would
be a mistake to do so and give up the moral high ground that serves as
the underpinnings of our claim to international accord.
E. Military Commissions and Unlawful Combatants
Next, we need to consider what the international law of warfare has to
say about persons who attempt to inflict destruction on a particular
nation and its inhabitants. One reason for delving into this topic is that
much of the discussion of spies and comforters of the enemy draws on
the law of war as justification for treating these as military matters rather
than crimes of treason or other civilly defined offenses.
Colonel Winthrop begins from the proposition that the law of war is
limited to the "theatre of operations" and sets out a frame of reference
for the citizens of belligerent states.' 7 "[U]pon the declaration or initiation
of war," he says, "not merely the opposed military forces but all the
inhabitants of the belligerent nations ... become ... the enemies both of
the adverse governments and of each other."'
18
Civilian enemies, however, are not necessarily combatants. The
civilian is disempowered from trading with civilian enemies and is at
risk of having his property destroyed or seized if it is useful to the
enemy, but a noncombatant is not to be subjected to personal violence.
Among the few reasonably consistent edicts of warfare throughout
recorded history are the rules protecting noncombatants. In modern
times, those rules have extended to those engaged in medical or
spiritual support of combatants. It is a clear violation of the law of war
to target noncombatants, although obviously civilian casualties have
been heavy in some instances of bombing. The justification advanced
by western nations for civilian casualties of bombing is that it is the
other side's choice of where to place military industrial targets and that
117. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 776 (2d ed. 1920).
118. Id.
if we target those structures, then the "collateral damage" to civilian
populations is not our fault.
The principal gray area for noncombatants is in the category of "camp
followers" or "retainers." Civilian employees of the military are subject to
capture just as if they were prisoners of war and are to be treated as such,
but they are not to be subjected to violence so long as they do not
threaten violence themselves. Winthrop states that [c]amp followers,
although they may be made prisoners, are to be treated as noncombatants. 119
Winthrop deals rather cursorily with the question of "THE FORCES
BY WHICH WAR IS TO BE WAGED" and states that "the general rule
that the operations of war on land can legally be carried on only through
the recognized armies or soldiery of the State as duly enlisted or
employed in its service." He has a special place for "irregulars" or
"guerillas." "Irregular armed bodies or persons not forming part of the
organized forces of a belligerent, or operating under the orders of its
established commanders, are not in general recognized as legitimate
troops or entitled, when taken, to be treated as prisoners of war but may
upon capture be summarily punished even with death."' 12  This is a
surprisingly harsh statement in a text generally attempting to place more
civilized and humane boundaries on the conduct of warfare, and the
explanation can be found in the image that he portrays of marauding
bands inside the enemy's borders: "killing, disabling and robbing of
peaceable citizens or soldiers ... from motives mostly of personal profit
or revenge."' 121 The picture of undisciplined, non-uniformed persons
wreaking havoc upon civilians and blending back into civilian
populations is Winthrop's contribution to the earliest depiction of what
today we might call a terrorist.
This depiction is significantly different from the image one has of a
citizen defending his homeland against an invading force. Would we
really expect summary execution of a person captured while shooting
back at invaders from inside his home? The 1949 Geneva Convention
dealt explicitly with this phenomenon by including within the definition
of prisoners of war, and thus protected from summary punishment, both
organized militias which "conduct their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war" and those "inhabitants of a non occupied
territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms
to resist the invading force" [emergency defense of home] .122 What evolved
between the 19th Century and the end of World War II, it appears, is a
119. Id. at789.
120. Id. at 783.
121. Id. at784.
122. Geneva Convention Relating to Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4
[hereinafter GPW].
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sense that the treatment of a person depends more on how that person
behaved during warfare than on the official status of the person.
The 1949 Geneva Convention recognizes that rules are one thing and
application another by providing that if there is any doubt about whether
a person belongs to the protected categories, then "such persons shall
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their
status has been determined by a competent tribunal. 123 The companion
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons provides that
there shall be no reprisals and that no "protected person may be punished
for an offence he or she has not personally committed."
12 4
The upshot of all this is that individuals who are captured in the course
of military action in another country must be treated as prisoners of war
or civilians unless they were engaged in clandestine use of arms without
the excuse of emergency defense of home. According to Winthrop, who
probably had a good sense of the "customs and usages" of war, a person
clandestinely using arms without the emergency home defense excuse
could have been summarily executed upon capture. There can be little
doubt that the customs and usages have changed in the past century to
the point that no summary executions are allowed under any circumstances.
Indeed, the most recent statements on war crimes would make it a crime
to pass sentence on, or execute anyone, who is hors de combat without
previous judgment by a regularly constituted court.1
25
III. DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL
If the detainees are alien combatants in a war against the United
States, then there is no crime in taking up arms against the United States.
In a sense, this is the flip side of the reasons why these people are not
prisoners of war. The question for this group is simply at what point
must they be repatriated?
On the other hand, citizens who are alleged to have taken up arms
against the United States essentially are accused of treason, which may
also be a subject of military law if the appropriate jurisdictional elements
are met. There are also practical arguments for allowing the military to
detain indefinitely, such as preventive detention, detention to assist
123. Id. at art. 5.
124. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of
War, August 12, 1949, art. 33, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
125. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(c)(iv), at 8, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
interrogation, or avoiding disclosure of classified information. Although
some of these approach justification of military detention of "enemy
combatants," none is sufficiently persuasive to undermine the fundamental
bedrock of Anglo-American concepts of due process entitling an
accused to a hearing on specified charges before a competent tribunal.
A. Indeterminate Duration of Hostilities
One argument for detention without trial could track closely the
analogy of war. Because the suspected terrorist is part of a group that
has promised continuing hostile action, the members of the group can
hardly be turned loose to help carry out that promise. Prisoners of war
are detained for the duration of hostilities because it would be foolish to
send them back to have another chance to kill people on our side. This
is a compelling argument if we can be sure that the person to whom it
applies is in fact committed to taking violent action.
Criminology has put substantial effort into the predictability of the
violent offender, or at least of identifying the factors that tend toward
anti-social behavior. Young males are far more likely to commit violent
crimes than any other group.126 Perhaps violence would be reduced
dramatically if we could just warehouse all males between the ages of
sixteen and thirty. In a more serious vein, the "idea of incapacitation is
simply that offenders separated from society will not be able to inflict
,,121harms on innocent people during the period of their incarceration.
There are many students who argue against repeat offender laws on the
basis that they tend to apply only to those offenders who are already
nearing the end of their criminal careers.
28
There are two problems with the incapacitation model in criminal law.
One is that the predictive factors are still just too uncertain to allow
anyone to make more than just an educated guess about whether a
particular person is likely to commit a violent crime. Even the principles
of rehabilitation and parole have fallen on hard times in recent decades.
The second problem is that the very idea of predictive incapacitation
conflicts with our deeply held values of free will. We want desperately
to believe that even the most likely offender can have a change of heart
before harming innocent persons.
Indeed, it is this emphasis on free will that lies at the heart of
126. See R.J. Herrnstein, Criminogenic Traits, in CRIME 39, 40-43 (James Q.
Wilson & Joan Petersilia, eds., 1995).
127. Brian Forst, Prosecution and Sentencing, in CRIME, supra note 126, at 363, 376.
128. The Supreme Court upheld, in a fractured decision, validity of habitual offender
statutes against challenges based on "cruel and unusual punishment." Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
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conspiracy law. We don't punish for joining groups or even for planning a
criminal act. We insist on an overt act in furtherance of the plan for the
very reason that we do not want to punish evil intent or proclivities
without providing the opportunity for the potential miscreant to "wise up."
Suppose we decided to lock up a person just for being a member of a
terrorist organization. The task is daunting and the problems multiply
rapidly. First of all, there are too many to be all-inclusive so the effort
will be highly select and arbitrary. Secondly, for each person that we
treat in this fashion, we persuade two or more fellow-travelers to convert
to the cause. Next, we cut off some of the most promising sources of
information about the plans of terrorist organizations. Lastly, this action
would undercut the whole notion of free will and persuasion to peaceful
dispute resolution.
All of this just relates to the question of whether we want to pursue the
prospect of indefinite detention without trial. The very idea is anathema
to Western notions of law and justice, but it has to be mentioned. With
regard to a person who has been proven guilty of active participation in a
conspiracy, whether in military or civilian trial, a very lengthy sentence
may be appropriate. After all, the conspiracy of terrorism is conspiracy
to commit murder (probably on a broad scale, and probably of unknown
persons), so the prospect of near life imprisonment is not out of bounds.
The emphasis here is on the need to have a trial for an act-the question
of sentence is another matter entirely.
B. Detention as Incentive To Talk
In one explanation of the Government's position with respect to both
Hamdi and Padilla, the Government has argued that they should be
detained in isolation to promote their talking about knowledge of the al-
Qaeda organization and its future plans.129 Deal brokering with organized
crime members is certainly not unknown, but it usually takes place in the
context of criminal trials. It can also lead to abuses in which government
officials end up protecting ongoing criminal activity to obtain information
on other criminal activity.
130
129. "The moment that counsel is inserted between an enemy combatant and his
captors, the relationship of dependency on which fruitful interrogation depends may be
destroyed." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Brief for Respondents-Appellees at 13 #02-6895 (4th Cir.).
130. Some particularly heinous abuses of the criminal justice system have been
alleged recently in the context of protected Mafia informants in the Boston area. The
allegations include the proposition that government informants were allowed to perjure
The major problem with indefinite detention to obtain information is
that it flies in the face of basic notions of due process, at least in the
American system if not internationally as well. At the domestic level, it
has been said repeatedly that government cannot incarcerate someone
without due process, meaning at least a decision by a competent tribunal.
Although we can use incarceration as a method of coercing information
from an individual in American law, it is accomplished only by court
order and then almost never carried out. In civil litigation, for example,
refusal to provide information in discovery can become the basis of a
court order under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Refusal to comply with the order can then be punished by contempt.
Although in theory a court can order a contumacious witness to be
incarcerated until he or she complies,' 3' in practice this power is rarely,
if ever, exercised because the courts have other less intrusive remedies
available and because incarceration is surrounded by heavy procedural
safeguards.' 32  If an individual can be shown to have information to
which a government agency has a right, then a court will order the
individual to divulge that information, 33 and refusal to obey that court
order could result in imprisonment for contempt of court. 134 Contempt
may also be used to coerce a witness to testify before a grand jury.
But "the justification for coercive imprisonment as applied to civil
contempt depends upon the ability of the contemnor to comply with the
court's order" and "a court must exercise 'the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed."",136 In all these examples, the requirement
themselves to obtain convictions of their enemies for crimes actually committed by the
informants themselves. See AP, Boston Mobster and ex-FBI Informant Sentenced to Life
in Prison, available at http://www.courttv.com.trials/news/012704 bostonmobap.html (Jan.
27,2004).
131. See Fremont Energy Corp. v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 688 F.2d 1285 (9th
Cir. 1982).
132. See Mertsching v. United States, 704 F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1983) (dismissal of
lawsuit for failure to answer questions).
133. The appropriate procedure is for the agency to file a lawsuit for enforcement of
an administrative subpoena. See Smith v. United States, 289 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2001);
see also NLRB v. G. Rabine & Sons, 144 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P1 1, 154 (N.D. I1l. Sept. 10,
2001).
134. Courts will often attempt to avoid using incarceration as a method of coercing
disclosure of information. One court held that "[iln the case of administrative subpoenas,
parties may immediately appeal district court order enforcing these subpoenas, as the
Supreme Court has deemed them to be 'self-contained, so far as the judiciary is
concerned[.]." Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 330 (1940)).
135. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) ("Where contempt
consists of a refusal to obey a court order to testify at any stage in judicial proceedings,
the witness may be confined until compliance.").
136. Id. at 371 (citing Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948) ("the justification for
coercive imprisonment as applied to civil contempt depends upon the ability of the
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of a court order at least ensures a judicial check against governmental
abuse in the quest for information. In addition, courts are adamant that
incarceration be circumspectly applied, if at all.
At the international level, a number of provisions need to be
considered. One is the provision from the Geneva Convention that prisoners
of war cannot be punished for wrongdoing without a determination of
wrongdoing by a competent tribunal. Another is the proscription on
hostage-taking that has been built into several international treaties and
conventions. Is the detainee essentially being held hostage for information?
The common sense idea of hostage-taking is that the detained person is
being held until someone else is given up. But it could be argued that
holding someone until he gives up information in his own possession is
no different.
The Supreme Court of Israel dealt with two levels of this argument in
Anonymous v. Minister of Defence.137 The unnamed petitioners were being
held under the Israeli Emergency Powers [Administrative Detention]
Law of 1979, which has been in effect for over 20 years as an
"emergency" measure. It authorizes detention of persons as to whom "the
Minister of Defence has reasonable cause to believe that reasons of State
security or public security require that a particular person be detained."
The order of detention can be renewed every six months so long as the
same findings are made. In the Anonymous case, the government conceded
that the individuals in custody no longer represented a threat themselves
(how this could be known is a mystery) but that they could be held as
bargaining chips to obtain information from terrorist groups about a
missing Israeli soldier.
In its initial decision in this case, the Israeli Court held that there was
nothing in Israeli law to counter the grant of power to the Minister of
Defence. With regard to basic human rights principles, the Court merely
said that it is the legislature's job to create a "balance between freedom
and dignity on one hand and security on the other." After severe criticism
from a number of quarters, the Court granted a rehearing and reversed
contemptor to comply with the court's order."); id. (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 204 (1821) ("a court must exercise '[t]he least possible power adequate to the
end proposed."').
137. 54(1) P.D. 721 (Sup. Ct. Israel 1997). I do not pretend to read Hebrew, so this
discussion relies on the description of the Court's opinions in Emanuel Gross, Human
Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative Detention in Israel: Does a
Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 721, 722 (2001).
itself. Noting that international law prohibits hostage-taking, the Court
said that using a detainee as a bargaining chip "comprises a serious
infringement of human dignity." The Court pointed out that the detainees
could not provide the desired information themselves and thus "detention of
the appellants is nothing other than a situation in which the key to a
person's prison is not held by him but by others."'
138
But what if the information in fact were in the person's own head?
Would detention to persuade him to talk still constitute an illegal hostage
situation? This may be an interesting question in international law,
but it is virtually irrelevant to American law because the concept of
administrative detention without court order has been unknown until now.
C. Detention To Prevent Violent Acts
Another argument for detention could be that the individual can be
held because he represents a danger to public safety, that if released he
would be likely to commit an act of violence. Other than civil commitment,
the only detentions without conviction that American law has acknowledged
have been those for purposes of pre-trial proceedings or those based on
some judicial mechanism for preventing administrative abuse. During the
1960s and 1970s, there was some thought given to the notion of
"preventive detention," under which persons who were a threat to society
could be incarcerated, but this idea mostly died out under political
pressure. The portion that remained is the presence in a few states of
civil commitment proceedings for violent sexual offenders. These persons
are thought to be in a special category because evidence shows that they
tend not to "age out" of their aggressive behavior. 139 These statues are
little different from those that authorize civil commitment for a person
who is "a danger to himself or others."
When the Kansas sexual offender statute was challenged, the Supreme
Court stated, "[w]e have consistently upheld such involuntary commitment
statutes provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures
and evidentiary standards."' 4°
Although freedom from physical restraint has "always been at the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental
action," that liberty interest is not absolute. The Court has recognized that an
individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint may
be overridden even in the civil context. 
14 1
138. See generally id.
139. Indeed, evidence exists to show that a sexual offender will still engage in
physical abuse even after chemical castration eliminates the sexual urge.
140. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997).
141. Id. at 356 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
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Now that Britain and Israel have adopted emergency detention provisions,
is the United States likely to follow suit? Perhaps more incidents such as
the attacks of 9/11 could persuade the populace to go along with such a
severe imposition on basic liberties, but the courts are not likely to play
along.
D. Problems With the Civilian Criminal System
Finally, what is wrong with use of the civilian court system for trial of
those Guantanamo detainees who are accused of being al Qaeda confederates?
or of additional persons arrested and accused of being part of a terrorist
cell, such as the Lackawanna Six or the Portland Five? or Jose Padilla?
One problem with use of the criminal process for alleged terrorists is
in defining a crime. Clandestine use of arms may well constitute a crime
under international law. There are ample crimes that can be charged in
the civilian system under the heading of universal jurisdiction. Crimes
against air piracy, hostage taking, and destruction of life or propert, are
all criminalized by U.S. statute as well as by international conventions.
The only thing lacking in international law is a proscription against
terrorism generally.
The United States has attempted to fill the terrorism definitional void
by defining the crime of providing material support to a terrorist or a
designated terrorist organization. 142 These statutes are being employed
142. There are two statutes, one for providing material support or resources
knowing or intending that they be used in violent acts, and the other for providing
material support or resources to a designated organization.
18 U.S.C. 2339A (2000). Providing material support to terrorists
(a) Offense. Whoever, within the United States, provides material support or
resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of
material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [specified federal crimes], or
in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment or an escape from the
commission of any such violation, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than 10 years, or both.
(b) Definition. In this section, the term "material support or resources" means
currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment,
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation,
and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.
18 U.S.C. 2339B (2000). Providing material support or resources to designated foreign
terrorist organizations
(a) Prohibited Activities.-(1) Unlawful conduct. Whoever, within the United
States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or
against those who may be supportive of others who have committed or
planned to commit violent acts. In a sense, the statute defines a conspiracy
without calling it a conspiracy. Even under the relaxed standards of
conspiracy law, the criminal defendant is not usually accountable absent
knowledge of the general nature of a crime that is to be committed.
Generalized knowledge that a group is likely to carry out violent action
when the occasion arises is not enough for conviction of conspiracy to
commit the crime.
Under the most relaxed view of due process, reflected in the anti-labor
and anti-communist legislation of the early 20th century, the Supreme
Court did uphold legislation that made it a crime merely to belong to an
organization with unlawful objectives. 143 When the red baiting of the
1950s subsided, the Court then stated that these holdings had been
thoroughly discredited and that constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such actions.'
If an individual were subjected to prosecution for belonging to a
terrorist organization, U.S. constitutional guarantees would require proof
that the individual knew of the imminence of violence. This is the type
of evidence that may be extremely difficult to marshal with regard to
someone whose role in a foreign organization took place clandestinely in
various foreign arenas.
Perhaps the most salient argument against the civilian justice system is
the military courts' ability to "provide for in a manner consistent with the
protection of information classified or classifiable... the handling of,
admission into evidence of, and access to materials and information."'
' 45
The civilian courts similarly can hear claims of privilege that would
prevent disclosure of classified information, but because criminal
proceedings must be open to the public, the civilian courts could not
receive that evidence without making it known to the public. Indeed, the
conspires to, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both.
(d) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction
over an offense under this section.
143. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-73 (1927). Interestingly, Justices
Brandeis and Holmes in concurrence described "advocacy of criminal syndicalism" as a
crime "very unlike the old felony of conspiracy [because it creates] guilt although the
society may not contemplate immediate promulgation of the doctrine." See also Hemdon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937) (prosecution for speech must show a "reasonable
apprehension of danger.").
144. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1970).
145. Military Order, supra note 7, § 4(c) (4).
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U.S. Court of Military Appeals has held that the right of public trial
applies to courts-martial, so it will be interesting to see if military
commissions may operate any differently. 1
46
The administration does not want a public trial with disclosure of
evidence because it does not want public disclosure of the sources of its
information. Moreover, in many instances that information might be
sufficient to justify a reasonable Berson's acting on it but fall short of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, it is worth pointing out what
the criminal defendant would be entitled to receive: a speedy and fair
public trial, a terminable sentence commensurate with the evidence,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that this individual participated in
conduct amounting to a crime under U.S. law or universal law.
The heart of the problem with open trials for alleged terrorists is that
thwarting well-organized, well-disciplined, fanatical groups will require
intelligence work premised on infiltration. This means placing informants
into, or buying the cooperation of informants within, the heart of the
organizations. We will be doing business with some very nasty people,
and we will need to protect those people by not revealing the nature of
the information we have about those we capture. Revealing that information
necessarily would demonstrate the source of the information, thus
jeopardizing the informants who provided it.1
48
These problems have been addressed by Congress at least twice in the
past two decades, once in the Calassified Information Procedures Act of
1980149 and gain in the 1996 statute criminalizing materializing material
support for terrorist organizations. 50 In essence, these statutes permit the
trial judge in a criminal prosecution to review government claims for
secrecy of evidence in camera, to order use of redacted disclosures or
summaries, and to exclude classified information from introduction at trial.
The extent to which classified information can be handled consistently
with the defendant's rights to confrontation and due process remains to
146. United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (U.S.C.M.A. 1972).
147. The Military Order authorizing commissions for trial of alleged al Qaeda
members uses a reasonableness standard rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.
148. In some instances, the source of the information may be a person who is still
entrenched in the organization and providing further information. Disclosing the identity
of an in-place informant is obviously detrimental to the health of that person. In other
instances, the source may be highly sophisticated technology and disclosure of its
operation would give the organization clues about how to avoid detection.
149. 18 U.S.C. app (2000).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000).
be seen. Certainly, judges could be presented with some excruciatingly
difficult choices, in the extreme being faced with the prospect of
releasing a very nasty terrorist to prevent disclosure of information in a
public trial. One consolation is that the terrorist is not likely to have
committed only one crime; there may be other offenses that can be
charged without the need for disclosure of classified information.
Perhaps another consolation would be that the government is not about
to let that person wander loose in public without constant surveillance.
This will be expensive, yes, but perhaps not that much more expensive
than lifetime confinement would be anyway.
E. Judicial Review of Military Detentions
Hamdi is a U.S. citizen who was captured in the military engagement
(i.e. during wartime) in Afghanistan. The Government has not chosen to
disclose the circumstances of his capture, whether he was actively engaged
in carrying arms against U.S. troops or what he was doing. Padilla, by
contrast, was arrested by civilian authorities while deplaning in Chicago
after a trip to Pakistan, during which he allegedly made plans to detonate
a "dirty bomb" in the District of Columbia. In both cases, the Justice
Department is taking the position that the Government is not required to
disclose to a court the basis for the detention beyond the conclusion that
each is an "enemy combatant." The Government takes the position that
both can be held without benefit of counsel as part of its interrogation
strategy. The justification for this position is that the United States may
capture and detain enemy combatants without review by the courts.
"Especially in a time of active conflict, a court considering a properly
filed habeas action generally should accept the military's determination
that a detainee is an enemy combatant."'' 5 Even granting the wiggle room
of the word "generally," this is at best an astonishing statement. If made
by the government of any number of Third World countries over the last
half century, it would bring instant rebuke from both left and right political
allegiances. The U.S. Government, apparently recognizing the enormity
of the statement, immediately asserts that its position "does not nullify
the writ." The Government suggests two checks on the military. First, the
court can insist on a statement of the detainee's status; second, the courts
are assured of the efficacy of political checks on the executive branch.
The first question presented by Hamdi is whether there is review
authority to determine whether indeed the detainee is an "enemy
151. Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 29-30, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450
(4th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-6895) [hereinafter
Respondents' Brief].
[VOL. 5: 7, 2004] Military Detention and the Judiciary
SAN DIEGO INT'L LJ.
combatant." The Hamdi brief attempts reassurance by stating that:
although a court should accept the military's determination that an individual is
an enemy combatant, a court may evaluate the legal consequences of that
determination. For example, a court might evaluate whether the military's
determination that an individual is an enemy combatant is sufficient as a matter
of law to justify his detention even if the combatant has a claim to American
citizenship. In doing so, however, a court may not second-guess the military's
determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant, and therefore no
evidentiary proceedings concerning such determination are necessary.
But the Government also takes the position that the enemy combatant
determination is "sufficient as a matter of law to justify his detention." If a
court were to decide as the Government wished, then the enemy combatant
determination effectively isolates the detainee from any judicial oversight
whatsoever. The Supreme Court never hesitated in either Quirin or
Eisentrager to assert its authority to make the basic determination of the
prisoner's status. Anything less would undercut the entire structure on
which this nation's jurisprudence is built. If there were any need for specific
authority for this proposition, we need look no further than the essentials of
due process in the Fifth Amendment, seizure and arrest requirements in the
fourth amendment, and place of trial requirements in the Sixth Amendment.
If, on the other hand, the court decided that a military determination
were not sufficient as a matter of law, then the Government would have to
decide what its next step should be. We can speculate that it would then
turn either to proof of combatant status or to another course such as trial
for specific criminal conduct. Pursuing the first course requires asking
what sort of evidence would be required for the United States to justify its
holding a citizen without trial. What might this be? Actually, with Hamdi
all the Government needs to show is that he was bearing arms against the
United States. For a person captured bearing arms in the "theater of
operations," a military commission should have ample jurisdiction.1
2
The second reassurance offered by the United States in Hamdi is the
usual fallback for executive discretion. Coupling two different statements
from the Federalist Papers together, the Government asserts that the
courts have no role in "reviewing military decisions or operations." The
first statement from the Federalist is said to be that, with regard to
military affairs, "if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the
proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger [by the
minority], and [the community] will have an opportunity of taking
152. Respondents' Brief, supra note 151, at 30.
measures to guard against it." '53 Looking at this language in context leads
almost to the conclusion that the Government is playing cynical games. The
passage is by Hamilton and concerns assurances that Congress will have
control of the military by virtue of its inability "to vest permanent funds for
the support of an army" and by action of the "party in opposition." When
the entire objective of the executive is to hide information from the other
branches and the public, as in Hamdi, it is difficult to place much reliance
on the power of the Loyal Opposition. The second quote, regarding the
judiciary's lack of influence over either sword or purse, related to
assurances that the judiciary would not be able to rule by fiat.'
54
153. THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton). The language chosen by the
Government in Respondents' Brief, supra note 151, at 30, is indicated:
The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this provision, once at
least in every two, years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military
force on foot to come to a new resolution on the point and to declare their
sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are
not at liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the
support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose
in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must
be expected to infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the
national legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the
views of the majority. The provision for the support of a military force will
always be a favorable topic for declamation. As often as the question comes
forward, the public attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the
party in opposition and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the
proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have an
opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. [emphasis added]
Independent of parties in the national legislature itself, as often as the period of
discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant
but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against
encroachments from the federal government, will constantly have their
attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough,
if any thing improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and not only to
be the voice, but, if necessary, the arm of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community require time to mature
them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace those liberties,
could only be formed by progressive augmentations which would suppose, not
merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive, but a
continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such a combination
would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be persevered in and transmitted
along, through all the successive variations in the representative body, which
biennial elections would naturally produce in both houses Is it presumable, that
every man, the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House of
Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to his
country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man, discerning
enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise
his constituents of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made,
there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The people should
resolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their
own hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are counties,
in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person.
154. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Using these quotes to support plenary military authority is far from fair
to the authors of the Federalist Papers, who could hardly have been arguing
in favor of rule by military fiat. They had just fought a war against a
runaway monarch, had drafted a Constitution full of checks on executive
power, and were consistently reminding the public of the need to be
vigilant against the abuses of a standing army.
The Fourth Circuit's response to these arguments155 was to straddle both
sides of the fence, an uncomfortable if not downright painful position.
After reciting the reasons for judicial deference to executive military
decisions and praising American reliance on the Bill of Rights and habeas
corpus, the court held that Hamdi could be detained because in fact he had
been captured bearing arms against the United States in an active combat
zone. "We shall, in fact, go no further in this case than the specific context
before us-that of the undisputed detention of a citizen during a combat
operation undertaken in a foreign country and a determination by the
executive that the citizen was allied with enemy forces."
The Fourth Circuit seemed to hold that a court must accept the factual
determinations of the military without judicial review'56 but it backed off
the most extreme implications of this position by gratefully accepting the
Government's "voluntary" submission of some factual information. 157 A
155. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 337 F.3d 335
(4th Cir. 2003).
156. "The factual inquiry upon which Hamdi would lead us, if it did not entail
disclosure of sensitive intelligence, might require an excavation of facts buried under the
rubble of war. The cost of such an inquiry in terms of the efficiency and morale of
American forces cannot be disregarded. Some of those with knowledge of Hamdi's
detention may have been slain or injured in battle. Others might have to be diverted from
active and ongoing military duties of their own. The logistical effort to acquire evidence
from far away battle zones might be substantial. And these efforts would profoundly
unsettle the constitutional balance." Id. at 471.
157. "This deferential posture, however, only comes into play after we ascertain
that the challenged decision is one legitimately made pursuant to the war powers. It does
not preclude us from determining in the first instance whether the factual assertions set
forth by the government would, if accurate, provide a legally valid basis for Hamdi's
detention under that power. Otherwise, we would be deferring to a decision made
without any inquiry into whether such deference is due. For these reasons, it is appropriate,
upon a citizen's presentation of a habeas petition alleging that he is being unlawfully
detained by his own government, to ask that the government provide the legal authority
upon which it relies for that detention and the basic facts relied upon to support a
legitimate exercise of that authority. Indeed, in this case, the government has voluntarily
submitted-and urged us to review-an affidavit from Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, describing what the government contends
were the circumstances leading to Hamdi's designation as an enemy combatant under
Article II's war power." Id. at 472.
fair reading of the Fourth Circuit's opinion is that the judiciary must
defer to the military and that the military must defer to the judiciary,
which shows the extraordinarily difficult position in which the court
found itself.
Given that difficulty, isn't this precisely the time to fall back on tradition
and on tried-and-true processes? Given the closeness of the question, the
best answer should be to choose the route that is least disruptive to the
American system of law and to insist that Hamdi be remitted to the civilian
justice system unless the military is willing to place him on trial for crimes
committed in a military theater of operations. In neither military- law nor
civilian law is there any justification for indefinite detention of an American
citizen once he is removed from the theater of operations. 1
58
The case of Jose Padilla is even more clear. Padilla is a U.S. citizen,
arrested on U.S. soil, carrying no weapons (he just stepped off a secure
airplane), but allegedly hoping to carry out an attack on U.S. soil at an
undisclosed date in the future. The Government first held him as a "material
witness" before a grand jury in New York but then transferred him to
military custody as an "enemy combatant." A habeas corpus petition in the
Southern District of New York was met with claims by the United States
that isolation of Padilla is necessary "to bring psychological pressure to bear
on him for interrogation," and that the court should accept the factual
conclusions of the Defense Intelligence Agency that Padilla was engaged on
a mission for a terrorist network. Whatever the facts that may be disclosed
to the court in camera, it is difficult to see how actions in a terrorist capacity
make a U.S. citizen subject to military power.
The Second Circuit was not persuaded, holding simply that "the
President's inherent constitutional powers do not extend to the detention
as an enemy combatant of an American citizen seized within the country
away from a zone of combat" and that Congress had not authorized
administrative or executive detention of citizens on home soil:
158. The Fourth Circuit saw the problems of conducting a trial as being
insurmountable in light of an ongoing war effort.
The factual inquiry upon which Hamdi would lead us, if it did not entail
disclosure of sensitive intelligence, might require an excavation of facts buried
under the rubble of war. The cost of such an inquiry in terms of the efficiency
and morale of American forces cannot be disregarded. Some of those with
knowledge of Hamdi's detention may have been slain or injured in battle.
Others might have to be diverted from active and ongoing military duties of
their own. The logistical effort to acquire evidence from far away battle zones
might be substantial. And these efforts would profoundly unsettle the
constitutional balance.
Id. at 471. But this argument is simply unpersuasive in light of modem communications
and transportation, especially a year after the military operation has reached 90% of its
objectives and now consists of something closer to occupation than active engagement.
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The offenses Padilla is alleged to have committed are heinous crimes severely
punishable under the criminal laws. Further, under those laws the Executive has
the power to protect national security and the classified information upon which
it depends. And if the President believes this authority to be insufficient, he can
ask Congress-which has shown its responsiveness-to authorize additional
powers. To reiterate, we remand to the District Court with instructions to issue
a writ of habeas corpus directing the Secretary of Defense to release Padilla
from military custody within 30 days. The government can transfer Padilla to
appropriate civilian authorities who can bring criminal charges against him.
Also, if appropriate, Padilla can be held as a material witness in connection with
grand jury proceedings. In any case, PSlilla will be entitled to the constitutional
protections extended to other citizens.
The Second Circuit's argument regarding lack of congressional
authorization relied heavily on the opinion of Justice Jackson in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube. '60 The court acceded "great deference" to
the Executive with respect to wartime powers, even stating, "We also
agree that whether a state of armed conflict exists against an enemy to
which the laws of war apply is a political question for the President, not
the courts. Because we have no authority to do so, we do not address the
government's underlying assumption that an undeclared war exists
between al Qaeda and the United States." Having yielded this level of
authority to the President, however, the court found that the assertion of
authority to detain a civilian on domestic soil "collide[d] with the
powers assigned by the Constitution to Congress."'
' 61
There is one glaring distinction between Padilla and the Quirin
defendants. The Quirin group was acting under the orders of an enemy
nation-state during a declared war. By contrast, al Qaeda is not a nation-
state, there is no "armed conflict" in process within the meaning of
international law, and there is no "law of war" for a military court to apply.
There are basically three ways to deal with Padilla. First, he could be
tried in civilian court for conspiracy to commit any number of crimes by
exploding a bomb. Second, he could be tried in military court for violation
of the law of war. Is there really any difference between trial in a
civilian court and a military court? The U.S. Court of Military Appeals
has applied the same standards of public trial requirements in dealing
with classified materials as would a civilian court. The problem is that
159. 2003 U.S. App Lexis 26516 at *84.
160. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38, 96 L. Ed.
1153, 72 S. Ct. 863 (Jackson, J., concurring). See A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias,
Quirin Revisited, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 309; Bryant & Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29
HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 373 (2002).
161. 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 26516 at *49-50.
without a nation-state sponsor or principal, there is no provision of the
law of war that Padilla has violated, and the military courts are not
statutorily authorized to try offenses that do not have a military connection.
Third, the Government argues that Padilla could be held in indefinite
military detention without any trial process at all. The minimum thrust
of due process, from Magna Carta forward, has been to prevent
unreviewed executive incarceration. Even with the precedent of Quirin,
it is not easy to construct a justification for allowing the military to hold
a U.S. citizen arrested on U.S. soil without trial. The defendants in
Quirin at least received a prompt (very prompt) military trial.
As in Hamdi, the Government argued that the President was entitled to
classify Padilla as an enemy combatant under the precedent of Quirin
and that the determination was entitled to deference from the courts.
When pressed by the district court as to why this should be the case, the
Government proffered basically two justifications for detention without
trial, to "prevent him from rejoining the enemy," and to allow investigators
to maintain "psychological pressure" to obtain information from him.
Despite the court's impatience with the Government's behavior in the case,
it accepted both arguments as valid and required only that "some
evidence" be offered to show that he was "engaged in a mission against
the United States on behalf of an enemy with whom the United States is
at war."
With all due respect, neither of the proffered justifications is persuasive.
And even under the court's standard, there is no possibility that al Qaeda
can be considered "an enemy with whom the United States is at war."
The argument of preventing Padilla from rejoining the enemy calls for
nothing more than a trial, conviction, and sentence. He should no more
be allowed to rejoin his al Qaeda buddies than should a drug lord be
allowed to rejoin his cohorts. What distinguishes Padilla from the common
street criminal with ties to a Colombian drug cartel? The wantonness of
his desire to kill and maim? Is he more akin to a serial killer or a mass
murderer? Granted this consideration (assuming it exists) should affect
the length of his sentence, but the concept of preventive detention has
been considered and rejected in any number of settings. Incarceration
follows proof, not mere suspicion or even unreviewed hearsay. The
court commented that prisoners of war could be detained "for the
duration of the hostilities," but there is not likely to be a duration of
hostilities with al Qaeda for the simple reason that there is no political
structure with which to negotiate terms and conditions of peace. The
object of war is peace, al Qaeda has no peaceful objectives, and the
conflict with al Qaeda cannot plausibly be considered a war.
The psychological pressure argument flies in the face of due process
and all its related themes. It is difficult even to imagine cases dealing
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with this kind of argument. Do we look at cases granting immunity as
the Government argued? Nothing in those cases even hint at isolated
confinement without judicial process. Court orders for immunity or to
compel testimony before a grand jury are court orders in which the
witness knows exactly what is demanded and knows the consequences
of refusing to divulge. Shall we look at the purposes behind Miranda?
If nothing else, Miranda means that nothing Padilla says in custody can
be used against him, but Miranda may stand for more: fair treatment of a
prisoner pending arraignment. Shall we look at the walls and barriers
built to prevent prosecutorial use of surveillance information under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act? Again, there is no custody, no
pressure, no psychological dependence. Frankly, the surprising part of
the Padilla district court opinion is that the judge did not declare this
argument to be an outrageous attack on the Constitution.
Finally, for the same reasons that there is not an enemy with whom to
negotiate a cessation of hostilities, there is no entity as to which to apply
the court's "some evidence" standard. Who is the "enemy with whom
the United States is at war?" Is al Qaeda different from the Basque terrorist
group ETA? Or from any number of other para-military organizations
that use violence against civilians either to make political points or to
carry out their own frustrations?
Accepting the Government's position in Hamdi, that civilian courts
may not inquire into the bases of classifying a person as an enemy
combatant, would constitute a radical change in the American way of
doing government business. That position in the context of Padilla, who
was not captured within any theater of operations, is quite simply
unsupportable. "War is too important to be left to the Generals" is a statement
intended to express something about limits on the use of force. In this
regard, however, it expresses something about the very nature of our
national psyche. In this situation, perhaps we should also be cognizant
that "this war is too important to be left to the politicians." The judiciary is
independent from the executive for a very good reason. It is the
People's check on abuses of executive power.
IV. STATUS OF THE GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
As of July 2003, "apProximately 660" persons were being held at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.' The initial detainees were captured in Afghanistan
162. U.S. Dept. of Defense, "Pentagon Announces Release of 27 Guantanamo
and alleged to be members of the Taliban militia. Over the intervening
two years, some persons have been released to their countries of nationality
while other alleged "enemy combatants" have been brought to Guantanamo,
some apparently having been captured in various countries as alleged
members of terrorist cells.
The Taliban detainees include nationals from a number of countries,
notably Britain, Australia, and Sweden, which have been demanding that
their citizens either be repatriated or accused of a crime.163 It is possible
that some of the detainees from the original Afghan captures could be
charged with terrorist acts in league with organizations such as AlQaeda,
but Government press releases and court filings indicated only that they
are being held for their involvement as functionaries of the Taliban
regime. 64
The United States administration will not likely prosecute many of the
Taliban in the U.S. criminal justice system, neither civilian nor military,
for the simple reason that most of them cannot be accused of crimes
cognizable under U.S. law. There are some, undoubtedly, who could be
brought to task for "crimes against humanity" on the basis of the human
rights violations that occurred in Afghanistan while the Taliban regime
was in place. Torture, dismemberment, and execution may be crimes
cognizable in universal jurisdiction, but only if they were either part of
an "armed conflict'1 65 or "committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against any civilian population ' 1 6 and only if the individual had a
culpable level of knowledge or intent. 67 Universal jurisdiction over acts
Detainees," DoD News Release No. 524-03 (7/18/03), http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/
2003/Oct/09-443040.html.
163. On November 25, 2003, Australia agreed to U.S. military trials for its nationals.
The United States and Australian governments announced today that they
agree the military commission process provides for a full and fair trial for any
charged Australian detainees held at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.
Following discussions between the two governments concerning the military
commission process, and specifics of the Australian detainees' cases, the U.S.
government provided significant assurances, clarifications and modifications
that benefited the military commission process.
DoD News Release 892-03, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031125-
0702.html.
Britain continues to negotiate for release of its nationals. Reuters, "Fresh Hope for UK
Guantanamo Detainees," http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsPackageArticle.jhtml?type=top
News&storylD=436356&section=news.
164. Professor Paust dealt with the POW issue in the context of whether the
detainees have the international version of due process rights under the GPW. Paust, 23
MICH. J.I.L. at 5-8n, n.15 & 16; Paust, 28 YALE J.I.L. at 328-34.
165. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereafter Rome Statute] art.
8(2); see Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17 (Dec. 10, 1998), Int'l Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia.
166. Rome Statute art. 7.
167. Rome Statute art. 25.
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of brutality generally does not apply to the internal actions of a state
against its own citizens until those acts rise to the level of systematic
torture. 168 Although it might be worthwhile to prosecute some of the
Taliban leadership for their most egregious violations of human rights,
there is no indication that the persons held by the U.S. military fall into
the leadership category. Moreover, in its position opposing the International
Criminal Court, the United States has expressed grave concern about the
concept of universal jurisdiction by which persons could be tried outside
their home countries for offenses committed against their own population.
The Government position with regard to all detainees denies any role
for judicial review over their status under the premise that Johnson v.
Eisentrager precludes habeas corpus for foreign nationals held outside
the United States. Although no court has yet granted habeas relief to a
detainee, no court has accepted this reading of Eisentrager. The Ninth
Circuit dismissed one set of habeas petitions on the basis that none of the
petitioners had a sufficient relationship with any detainee to qualify for
"next friend" status.' 69 The D.C. Circuit dismissed a petition by a detainee's
father on the ground that persons held outside the United States had no due
process rights protected by the U.S. Constitution. 7 0 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the D.C. case, and then the Ninth Circuit held that
habeas corpus relief would be available without specifying what sorts of
constitutional claims might be cognizable. 17 1 Surely, the power of judicial
review must be upheld, and the really interesting part of these cases will be
the question of whether the Supreme Court will hold some norms of
customary international law or treaty law to be judicially enforceable.
A. Prisoner of War Status and International Law
The United States issued an explicit policy statement that the persons
detained at Guantanamo Bay are not to be considered prisoners of war. 72
The statement distinguished between Taliban detainees and al Qaeda
168. The extradition of Augusto Pinochet from England to Spain was sought on the
basis of "state torture" committed "by or with the acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity." Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, I APP.
CAS. 147, 2 ALL ENG. REP. 97 (HL 2000).
169. Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers & Law Professors v. Bush, 310 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.
2002).
170. al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 157 L.
Ed. 2d 407, 2003 WL 22070725 (Nov. 10, 2003).
171. Gherebi v. Bush, 2003 U.S. app. Lexis 25625 (9th Cir. 12/18/03).
172. See U.S. White House, supra note 11.
detainees. With respect to the former, because the Taliban government was
never recognized as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, its troops
would not be POWs of a nation. With respect to the al Qaeda members,
the statement declares that they are members of a foreign terrorist group
and not entitled to POW status. The statement declared that although the
detainees are not entitled to POW privileges, they will be provided many
POW privileges as a matter of policy. The statement delineated some
aspects of humane treatment that would be available to the detainees and
some that would not. In general, they would be given food, clothing, and
shelter, but would not be provided access to money or purchasable goods.
The official policy statement is silent about many aspects of POW
treatment detailed under the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War
[hereinafter GPW]. First, however, we should be clear that if one is
neither arrested in the civilian system nor classified as a prisoner of war,
that person still cannot be treated with impunity and subjected to brutal
treatment. The universal rules of law, as well as various treaties and
conventions, prevent murder, torture, starvation, or holding of hostages. 1
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With regard to conditions of confinement, under the GPW, POWs are
entitled to minimum standards of food, clothing, shelter, and medical
treatment. Although the descriptions of these items in the GPW at first
glance might appear to describe a standard of living above the norm in
many third world countries, and above the poverty line in developed
nations, the standards do not require caring for prisoners at a level higher
than is afforded to the soldiers or citizens of the detaining nation. 74 It is
at least arguable that for a developed nation to provide grossly substandard
conditions to POWs would be a violation of the proscriptions against
starvation or inhumane treatment regardless of the language of the GPW.
Nevertheless, POW status under the GPW does guarantee these conditions
as more than a mere policy.
POW status would also trigger the right of international nongovernmental
organizations to inspect the premises and observe the treatment of
prisoners. The U.S. policy on the detainees accords the International
Committee of the Red Cross this visitation and consultation privilege.
POWs are entitled to means and places of worship, recreation, and
education. They are allowed to correspond with friends and relatives.
The U.S. policy contemplates allowing most of these opportunities with
limitations because "many detainees at Guantanamo pose a severe security
risk to those responsible for guarding them and to each other."
The policy statement is silent about the crucial issues of long-term
destiny of the detainees. POWs can be tried for offenses only as defined
173. See Rome Statute, supra note 123, at art. 8(2)(a).
174. GPW at art. 26.
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by the detaining power for its own soldiers, and under conditions equivalent
to those provided for the armed forces of the detaining power.17 In any
such proceeding, they are entitled at least to counsel, notice of charges,
and the opportunity to present evidence.
For present purposes, probably the most significant distinctive feature
of POW status is the right to repatriation, either at the end of hostilities
or when an individual is sufficiently sick or feeble as no longer to be a
threat to the detaining nation. This right alone reflects the difficulties in
according POW status to a suspected terrorist. Stated most simply, it is
difficult to imagine a point of cessation of hostilities with terrorism.
Generally speaking, a person serving in the armed forces of his country
has a personal animosity toward the armed forces of a hostile nation
principally because it is in his interests to do so. If it is necessary to
think and react in "kill or be killed" terms, then the soldier needs the
shield of personal animosity. But when the hostilities cease, the personal
animosity can cease because it had nothing to fuel it other than the
hostilities themselves. In other words, the soldier takes on the mission
of his government. Even when serving his family and people, he is
responding to a more or less official call to arms. When the call is
terminated, the likelihood of violence should diminish if not cease.
176
By contrast, the terrorist is responding to deep-seated animosity
independent of any official call to arms. The call is from irregulars to
begin with, and it is not made with a specific set of solutions in mind. It
may have quasi-political objectives but only the total collapse of the
targeted regime will satisfy those objectives, and often even that may not
turn off the animosity. 177 The personal animosity is the reason for the
hostilities, not the other way around. Therefore, an official cessation of
175. Id. at art. 82-88. Breaches of disciplinary rules, even including escape attempts,
can be punished only by withdrawal of privileges, minimal labor, or confinement. Id. at
art. 89.
176. Obviously, acts of postwar violence can and will occur, but usually they will
be sporadic, isolated events rather than an ongoing campaign of systematic violence.
When the latter does occur, the occupying force will take steps to deal with it. In U.S.
history, one of the most clear examples of this phenomenon was the rise of the KKK and
the reactions of the federal government following the Civil War.
177. Although terrorism is politically motivated, it does not have an objective that
calls for the terrorist strategies to cease at the culmination of a specified objective. See
CHRISTOPHER HARMON, TERRORISM TODAY 187 (2000). "Terrorists on the left and right
deliver their biggest impacts against the status quo, with its stability, moderation, and
rule of law, qualities clearly varying in their proportions according to the country in
question. That... is key to explaining why, when organizations dominated by terror rise
to power, they remain antithetical to popular self government." Id.
hostilities does nothing to assuage the personal animosity and the terrorist
continues to be a threat into the foreseeable future.
It does not make sense to speak of prisoners of war in the absence of a
war. And the struggle with terrorism is not a "state of armed conflict."
With neither an official sponsoring state nor an official means of declaring a
cessation of hostilities, the alleged terrorist is on his own and subject to
normal criminal processes.
The Taliban detainees should be separated from the al Qaeda members
for this purpose. The Taliban detainees were combatants of an enemy
government. The Taliban detainees could be repatriated into the tender
mercies of the new regime in Afghanistan without, for the most part,
presenting any greater likelihood of immediately joining a terrorist
organization than would be true for much of the Arab world's population,
many of whom carry intense hostility toward the Euro-NorAm culture.'78
In other words, absent some showing of individual circumstances, the
Taliban detainees are no more likely to be terrorists than any of millions of
their cohort, and the problem of continuing terrorist hostility is not
particularly defined by Taliban allegiance.
All of this points in the direction that the Taliban might have claims to
protection under various treaty provisions, most notably the GPW. The
problem with that approach is that treaty obligations generally exist
among nations and do not grant rights to individuals.
B. Enemy Aliens and Habeas Corpus
Several habeas corpus and related petitions were presented to federal
courts in the District of Columbia and consolidated under the heading of
Khaled al Odah v. United States.179 All these petitions were brought on behalf
of nationals of nations other than Afghanistan, 8 and all essentially challenged
the authority of the United States to hold the detainees without due process.
The D.C. Circuit held that habeas corpus is not available to aliens held
outside the "sovereign territory" of the'United States for the simple
reason that those persons have no constitutional rights under U.S. law.
178. We are dealing here with a recognizable group, the Taliban, although even that
group fractures into many individuals of varying ethnicity and even nationality.
Moreover, the statement in the text merely recognizes that there is a high level of anger
and bitterness in the Arab world toward the "West" without implying that only Islamic
fundamentalists constitute a threat of terrorist activities. Terrorists exist on every
continent with virtually every political or religious affiliation. See id. at 1-43.
179. 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4250 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
180. The named individuals on whose behalf relief was sought were 12 Kuwaitis, two
Australians, and two Britons, all of whom were alleged to be in Afghanistan for various
personal or humanitarian reasons, to have been kidnapped by locals, and to have ended up in
the hands of U.S. military forces without having taken up arms against the United States.
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Granted, it would hardly make sense to hold the United States to the
obligation to obey interpretations of the U.S. Constitution in dealing with
nationals of other nations in various places around the globe while on the
soil of other nations. Holding the United States to its obligations under
international law, and perhaps to the municipal law of whatever country
it is involved in, is difficult enough without adding the complication of
requiring our operations to obey potentially conflicting obligations of
domestic law. The problem, again, is that the requirements of international law,
treaties, and municipal law of other nations must be enforced through
diplomatic methods or perhaps through the courts of the other nation.
On the other hand, the Government's insistence on an unreviewable
discretion to classify persons as "enemy aliens" was firmly rejected by
the D.C. Circuit and by the Ninth Circuit in Gherebi. These detainees
were not nationals of a country with which the United States is in enemy
status. If an Australian chooses to commit crimes against the United
States, that does not make Australia an enemy. In an offhand bit of
dictum, however, the D.C. Circuit said that "[a]n 'alien friend' may
become an 'alien enemy' by taking up arms against the United States,
but the cases before us were decided on the pleadings, each of which
denied that the detainees had engaged in hostilities against America."
This is an unfortunate and unnecessary statement that runs counter to the
court's own argument that the U.S. "response" to 9/11 is "against a
network of terrorists operating in secret throughout the world and often
hiding among civilian populations." This response has nothing to do with
"enemy" status, which is the language of war and applies to relationships
among nations. The person who engages in hostilities against a nation
without any affiliation with another nation should be considered a
criminal, not an "enemy" within the language and laws of war.
The Ninth Circuit was adamant about this point, insisting that "we
simply cannot accept the government's position that the Executive Branch
possesses the unchecked authority to imprison indefinitely any persons,
foreign citizens included, on territory under the sole jurisdiction and
control of the United States, without recourse to any judicial forum.
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The Ninth Circuit declined to indicate what rules of law might be
enforceable in habeas but insisted that surely there must be some limits
when it pointed out that "at oral argument, the government advised us
that its position would be the same even if the claims were that it was
181. 2003 U.S. App Lexis 25625 at *9.
engaging in acts of torture or that it was summarily executing the
detainees."1
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Both the D.C. and Ninth Circuits have insisted that the federal judiciary
has habeas corpus power with regard to persons being held in territory
controlled by the United States. Given the examples of torture or summary
execution recited by the Ninth Circuit, this seems an eminently sensible
holding because even torture and summary execution in time of armed
conflict would violate established norms under the law of war. The
problem that reviewing courts will have is the same problem faced by
the courts in Hamdi and Padilla, responding to governmental assertions
that classified information should not be reviewed by the court or at least
not made available for response by the petitioner.
As the Second Circuit said with regard to Padilla, however, detention
is not the only option for the United States with respect to these detainees.
Taliban militia members could be remitted to the tender mercies of the
new regime in Afghanistan for prosecution of any wrongs committed
prior to their capture. And if the administration has evidence that any of
these persons has been involved in plotting with al-Qaeda, U.S. conspiracy
law is fully applicable. Therefore, if the administration is unwilling to
come forward with evidence of wrongdoing, then it is extremely difficult
to be sympathetic to a claim for executive detention. Once these persons
were removed from a combat zone, the argument on the basis of
Eisentrager depends on either trial and conviction or, at minimum, a
hearing of GPW status.
V. CONCLUSION
We have looked at just a few of the many governmental actions in the
"war" on terrorism. The few that we have considered coalesce in the
arena of defining terrorism offenses under the "law of nations" or the
"law of war."
With regard to the Guantanamo detainees, a distinction can be drawn
between those foreign nationals who were serving in the "regular" forces
of the Taliban regime who can be repatriated as soon as it is determined
that they have not individually committed a crime under either United
States or international law and persons affiliated with al Qaeda. With
regard to the alleged al Qaeda confederates, they could be transferred to
the civilian criminal system with attendant difficulties of the disclosure
of classified intelligence information. Perhaps they could be extradited
to another country for trial, but that presents issues of whether the
requesting country provides adequate safeguards for rights of the defendant.
182. Idat*51.
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With regard to persons accused of committing terrorist acts against the
United States or its interests, whether they are foreign nationals or U.S.
citizens should be irrelevant. Until the international community defines
terrorist crimes as being violations of the "law of war," the U.S. system
should commit that these persons be tried in civilian courts rather than
by military commissions. The principal reason for this conclusion is not
that the civilian courts are necessarily "better" than military commissions
but because there is no coherent distinction between the alleged terrorist
and the ordinary street criminal.
The law abhors incoherence. The lack of coherence in this setting
results from making the defining characteristic for recourse to a military
commission to be violation of the "law of war," and the international
community has not defined terrorist acts as violations of the law of war.
One approach worth exploring is that the definition of international
terrorism for this purpose should be limited to those who act "under
color of state authorization" in a fashion similar to the U.S. definition of
civil rights violations committed "under color of state law."
But all of this is ratiocination about the details of law of war, enemy
combatants, and military necessity is frankly beside the major point.
Terrorism is a phenomenon that has been with us for thousands of
years and will continue into the foreseeable future. It is misleading to
speak of a "war on terrorism" as if it were a military engagement with
a determinable objective.
The idea of indefinite military detention with no. hearing is simply
anathema to Anglo-American law. If there is any general thought that
comes to mind about terrorism and the processes of American law, it is
this: Terrorism is not subject to a war to be won with brute force, it is a
battle for the hearts and minds of a very large disaffected portion of the
world population. To win that battle, we must be better than we want to
be. One beginning point is building coherence into our legal responses,
and the history of our own country should be useful.
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